CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 570th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour for me to assume on behalf of Romania the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. I would like to assure you that in discharging my duties I shall be at your entire disposal and I look forward to your assistance and co-operation in this very busy month of August. I look forward also to having the invaluable help of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, of the Under-Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and of the secretariat in general.

I would like to begin this meeting by reading to you a message addressed to the Conference by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Adrian Nastase, on the occasion of Romania's assumption of the presidency for the month of August. The message reads as follows:

"Romania has the honour of assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. It is above all a period for taking stock of the work done during this year's session which will be the subject of the Conference's report to the United Nations General Assembly.

The year 1990 has seen developments of fundamental significance for the international climate, in Europe and throughout the world. We have entered a new, revolutionary phase in relations between States and nations.

For its part, Romania after the elimination of the dictatorship in December 1989, is pursuing, in the spirit of the principles for which the electorate opted in the free and democratic elections of 20 May 1990, a process of renaissance and renewal that is not without difficulty. Romania's fundamental options are democracy and pluralism, respect and full protection for the rights and freedoms inherent in the human person, elimination of super-centralized economic structures and transition to a market economy, and, externally, a broad opening to the whole world in order to link ourselves to the major processes and trends now prevailing internationally.

Present-day Romania is determined to contribute to, and become integrated in the future European structure underpinned by the strengthening, development and implementation of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act in a vision making it possible to rise above the bloc concept, pursue the process of disarmament with the participation of all States, ensure full transparency in the military field and develop and transform the CSCE into a system of peace, security and co-operation in Europe in close harmony with the global system for peace-keeping and international security.

The very essence of our foreign policy is the general development of relations with all the world's States on the basis of the principles of morality and international law and contribution to, and active involvement in international activities of immediate and longer-term interest.

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We shall give a special place to Romania's participation in the activities of the United Nations and other international organizations and bodies. In this context, a leading position belongs to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

Disarmament is still one of the great challenges facing mankind, an important, essential component of any stable system of international security.

In all the various forums and international structures for the consideration and negotiation of disarmament and arms reductions, the place and responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament are unanimously recognized. It is for this reason that we are following with interest and supporting the efforts to improve the activities and enhance the efficiency of the Conference in Geneva so that it can fully meet the legitimate expectations of the international community in keeping with the mandate entrusted to this negotiating body with a universal vocation. This is particularly so in the present situation, where rapid and positive transformations and developments under way in Europe, and in other parts of the world too, need to be reflected as fully and as soon as possible in the work and, above all, the results of the Conference on Disarmament.

The important re-thinking of strategic and military concepts and doctrines that is now under way, the dialogue between the United States and the USSR in the field of disarmament, the results to date and the prospects for the sustained pursuit of this process, the justified hopes regarding the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, the multiplication and diversification of the measures aimed at increasing confidence and security, the efforts to reduce tension in various parts of the world and to eliminate hot-beds of conflict, the ever more frequent and ever more successful recourse to the machinery of the United Nations, including the prerogatives of the Secretary-General, are all factors which mark the present international climate, a climate more favourable than ever now for international action in the field of disarmament, for the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

There is unanimous recognition of the efforts made in your Conference to negotiate a universal convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Along with the pursuit of, and involvement in the negotiating process, Romania has this year - as have other countries too - made significant gestures, in particular as regards confidence-building and measures to encourage at the political level the completion of the convention. Thus, as we stated in the plenary of the Conference, Romania does not produce and does not have chemical weapons and does not intend to produce or acquire such weapons in the future. Likewise, Romania is prepared to become an original party to a convention with universal participation on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Inspired by the will to contribute to progress in the work on elaborating the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the Romanian delegation recently provided, in a working paper of the Conference, full data on the production, possession or

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non-possession, use, import and export of substances produced by the civilian chemical industry which might be of relevance to the goals of the future convention. We wish to express the hope that the progress achieved in elaborating the "rolling text" of the draft convention and the moves that are still awaited from the countries involved in the negotiations will lead in the near future to the achievement of universal, comprehensive and balanced rules, including provisions on effective international control, for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

At the same time, Romania attaches due importance to the other items on the agenda of the Conference, in particular those aimed at nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. While supporting the goal of a total nuclear test ban, Romania accepts the principle of achieving this goal step by step. It welcomes any agreement on the limitation of underground tests and is ready to support any new moves in that direction. It is with particular pleasure that we noted the Conference's recent decision on the creation of an Ad hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. We wish to make the most concrete contribution we can to the substantive consideration of this topic in order ultimately to attain the prohibition of all nuclear tests. It is in the same spirit that my country participates in the work of the group of experts on the detection of nuclear tests by seismic means and the international programme under way in this field.

We consider that it is important now to find the most propitious ways and means to intensify the activities and increase as far as possible the negotiating character of the Geneva Conference.

This month Romania holds both the presidency of the United Nations Security Council and that of the Conference on Disarmament. International peace and security, together with disarmament, are at one and the same time, priority and complementary objectives; their interdependence and vital importance for the nations of the world have long since gone beyond the stage of efforts at conceptual demonstration.

I would like to take this opportunity to convey to the Conference and to all the delegations participating in its work my very best wishes for success, and to express at the same time the hope that the work this year, the conclusions which you reach in your report to the United Nations General Assembly will provide the bases for increased dynamism and outstanding results for your future work, giving to it an increased stamp of negotiation in conjunction with genuine political will and full commitment, commensurate with our times and the positive developments in international life".

That ends the message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania addressed to the Conference on Disarmament.

May I now on behalf of the Conference extend my most sincere thanks to my predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for the outstanding manner in which he conducted the work of the Conference during the month of July. I would like to express to him the appreciation of all the members of the Conference.

(The President)

His experience, his knowledge of multilateral diplomacy and his personal qualities contributed to the success of the Conference during the month which saw the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". I cannot fail to express my delegation's thanks to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for his tireless and resourceful work, which made possible the decisive steps towards the establishment of the Committee.

The presidency for the month of August is not an easy task, since we have the heavy burden of finalizing the report to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. The drafting of the report is an opportunity for us to take stock together of the work we have done.

This year we have managed to cover all the items on our agenda through organizational arrangements: either the creation of Ad hoc Committees or the holding of informal meetings of the Conference on item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". These meetings were useful because they enabled us to have a more structured and direct exchange of views on those subjects.

I would also like to mention the results of the informal consultations on the improvement and efficiency of the work of the Conference chaired by the Ambassador of Pakistan, His Excellency Mr. Ahmad Kamal. Although it cannot be said that each of us sees the issue of the efficiency of the Conference in the same way, our debates did show that it is necessary to try to find some better organization and more effective working methods in order to exploit the Conference's potential as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

Lastly, I would like to express the hope that the Conference continue in a positive fashion its efforts to give effect to the expansion of its membership decided on in 1983.

I note that the preparation of the report of the Conference is going well. However, some delays have already been announced in finalizing the reports of some subsidiary bodies and I would like warmly to urge the chairmen of the Committees to spare no efforts to keep to the timetable. I hope that the drafting and adoption of the final report will go as smoothly as possible.

I would like to inform the Conference that the secretariat will be distributing on Monday, 6 August, under the symbol CD/WP.388, the draft of the technical part of the annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. The text of the document will be available in all the official languages in delegations' pigeon-holes.

I intend to ask the Conference to hold an informal meeting on Thursday, 9 August, immediately after the plenary meeting, to begin the first reading of the technical part of the report to the General Assembly.

Distinguished representatives, ladies and gentlemen, before moving to today's debate, I have the pleasant task of reminding the Conference that yesterday, 1 August, our host country, which so generously accords us its hospitality, celebrated its national day. I would like to ask the

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distinguished representative of Switzerland, who is participating in our work as an observer, to accept and transmit our best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of his people.

We will now turn to our work for today. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of items 6 and 7 entitled, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons" and "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who wishes to raise any question relating to the work of the Conference may do so.

On the list of speakers for today we have the representatives of France, Argentina, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Nigeria, Peru and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Morel.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Permit me first of all to express our satisfaction at seeing the representative of Romania, a country that is a friend of and close to France, presiding over our work. We wish your country full success in the revolution that it is accomplishing in difficult circumstances, and we know that the holding of the presidency during an important month for the Conference will give Romania the opportunity to confirm its dedication to multilateral disarmament, which is precisely what was stressed in the message from the Foreign Minister of Romania, to which we listened with great interest.

I would also like to thank your predecessors for the opening month of the summer half session, Ambassadors de Rivero and Sujka, for the excellent impetus they gave to the work of the Conference, which was marked by a number of very interesting developments.

I would also like to welcome Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador Chadha of India and assure them of my delegation's full co-operation. Lastly, I would like to extend my wishes for success in their new duties to their predecessors, Ambassador de Azambuja, Ambassador von Stülpnagel and Ambassador Sharma, as well as to Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia and Ambassador Varga of Hungary.

At the time when the Conference is completing its work for this session, I would like to take as my point of departure the sweeping changes which have helped to alter the prospects for disarmament in order to present France's viewpoint on the questions which are of the most direct interest to us, namely nuclear disarmament in its various aspects and the other spheres of negotiation - outer space and radiological weapons, and, lastly, chemical weapons - before concluding with some thoughts on improving the functioning and efficiency of the Conference.

The scale of the changes that have occurred in less than a year in our continent has been commented on by many delegations and there is no need to revert to that. I would simply like to stress today their consequences, that

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is, the rapid transformation of the conditions in which countries situated in or involved in Europe are henceforth approaching questions of security and disarmament.

By contagion, minds have opened and the era of blocs is coming to an end once and for all. But it is not only the end of the post-war period that we are witnessing. As I emphasized recently in Vienna in the Preparatory Committee, the summit of the 35 States participating in the CSCE that will be held in Paris from 19 to 21 November next will mark still more profoundly the end of an epoch almost two centuries long in which, from the Congress of Vienna to the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the victors and the Powers of the day shared out Europe amongst themselves around a negotiating table. For the first time, 35 States will be meeting on an equal footing freely to make heard their voices and their choices and, transcending the logic of blocs, to debate the future of a Europe that is master of its own destiny and of its relations with the world around it. Between the old order that is unravelling and the new balances that are to be created, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has, 15 years after the Helsinki Final Act, the role of becoming the institution that will manage in everyone's best interests the transitional phase that is now beginning for all the participating countries.

Does this mean that these 35 countries are only concerned with themselves and unable to turn to the world that is around them and that is also changing? The fear of such introversion exists and there has already been denunciation here and elsewhere of the risk of a transfer of tensions from the East-West axis to the North-South axis; concerned with their own affairs, bent on consolidating their immediate security and fascinated by their return to history, the European countries may allow themselves to be drawn, even involuntarily, along the road of generalized disengagement, reducing their development assistance, leaving regional or local crises to fester, resigning themselves to the weakening of international organizations. Shutting de facto the rest of the world out of the transformation of the international system would lead to a game with a nil, and even a negative score: what was gained in the North would be more than lost in the South.

It goes without saying that such an approach would run against the current history and be fraught with consequences, and no one is prepared to resign himself to it. It suffices, indeed, to look beyond Europe to see that other changes, which are also substantial, are under way. Events are giving us a sharp reminder of that this very day. There is therefore no theoretical, political or geographical limit to the profound changes through which we are now living.

Multilateral disarmament is one of the instruments that enable these various transformations to be fitted into an overall perspective. Each forum has, of course, its raison d'être, and one cannot negotiate everywhere on all the issues. But there is already de facto combination of the three negotiating forums for, first, the reduction of strategic weapons (START), and the negotiations on space in a bilateral framework, then the negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces (CFE) and the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) of 35 nations in a regional framework and, lastly, the prohibition of chemical weapons in a multilateral framework, here. These three exercises are subject to similar timetables, since a

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two-fold result must be achieved by mid-November in Vienna, the START talks must be completed by the end of the year and the chemical convention must be completed next year. Furthermore, they are linked in substance: any delays in the chemical negotiations relative to the other two would give increased military significance to the existing stockpiles and means and could jeopardize the general movement towards disarmament which is now under way in earnest. Putting the negotiations in perspective in this way highlights the special responsibility that is ours. I shall be coming back to that later in my statement.

For obvious reasons, nuclear disarmament continues to occupy a decisive place. We share the unanimous desire of States to confirm and accelerate the movement that began with the major turning point of the INF Treaty, the first treaty organizing effective nuclear disarmament.

But the change thus begun must not cause us to lose sight of a number of fundamental facts that remain. The first is the considerable disproportion between the forces of the two greatest Powers and those of a country such as France. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China remarked in this very room last February, the elimination of half of their strategic nuclear forces would still leave the United States and the Soviet Union with over 90 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenal. France therefore welcomes the prospects held out by the future START agreement and described in the Conference on Disarmament by the two negotiators of that agreement. However, it also and especially approves the two countries' undertaking to continue their talks beyond the START-I treaty, with a view to further reductions and measures aiming at strategic stability.

As the President of the French Republic recently reiterated, "... when the time comes, France will not be the last to disarm". That time will draw nearer as fast as the well-known conditions which France introduced in the United Nations in 1983 are complied with, that is, a change of nature in the gap between our strategic forces and those of the United States and the USSR, the halting of the race for defensive technologies, the elimination of conventional imbalances and the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

In addition to the quantitative disproportions, another constant fact to be borne in mind is the difference in nuclear doctrines. That of France has always been not to win a war which has broken out, but instead to prevent the outbreak of war. To quote the President of the Republic, nuclear arms can only be "arms for non-use, diplomatic weapons of balance and resistance to all blackmail, wherever it comes from. They make the very undertaking of war irrational". There is, therefore, no point in trying today to reopen a moral or ethical trial of the nuclear component of deterrence; it has to be measured by the yardstick of stability - past, present and future.

As I have often stressed in this forum, the debate on nuclear deterrence remains open and it is part of our work. Our view is that, far from calling in question this notion, progress in nuclear disarmament would tend to confirm its soundness. The efforts made by the United States and the USSR to remedy the harmful effects of the over-abundance of strategic weapons, consolidate the specific role of nuclear deterrence, that is, to make war impossible. The

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characteristic of deterrence is, indeed, to keep strategic arms at the level that is strictly necessary. When the means of deterrence become more than sufficient, they nourish the destabilizing prospect of a temptation on someone's part to wage a war with a view to winning it.

Our country, therefore, has always considered that deterrence is defensive by its very nature. It precludes all superfluity, but it implies the maintenance of forces' credibility and the exercise of technological vigilance taking into account the state of the international environment and cannot, in the present circumstances, do without nuclear experiments.

This, then, is the fundamental reason for our position of principle on the question of a nuclear test ban, a ban to which we cannot subscribe in the form now given to it, namely that of a kind of preliminary to nuclear disarmament. The halting of tests is an integral, inseparable part of the whole of nuclear disarmament.

While continuing with its experiments, France has recently reduced the annual number of its explosions from eight to six. In that regard, it is following a policy of transparency which has made it possible for several international teams of independent specialists to come and verify on the spot the harmlessness of the French tests and pursuant to which my Government is now notifying each test carried out. Thus, from 18 to 20 April last, France was host in French Polynesia to a team of 30 doctors, including 10 members of the French branch of the Association of Doctors for the Prevention of Nuclear War, an organization which received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, and the team was able to carry out its inquiry freely at the Mururoa site and to hold a press conference in Tahiti during which it concluded that the French tests had no impact either on public health or on the environment.

Here, and as it announced in July last year, my delegation did not obstruct the consensus of the Conference with respect to the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on a test ban. But, as its position of principle remains unchanged as to the priorities in nuclear disarmament, it does not see how it could join in an exercise which contradicts those priorities.

We are ready, however, to participate in the parallel technical activities that in no way prejudge the political aspects of the question. That is why we participated in the seminar organized at the beginning of the year in Oslo on regional seismic detection stations and are participating, for the second time, in the experimental exchange of seismic data which is now under way in connection with the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

As for another aspect relating to nuclear weapons, that is, negative security assurances, my delegation has made its views known in the Ad hoc Committee chaired by Ambassador Negrotto of Italy and whose report is being distributed today. It has supported the Committee's efforts to hold informal consultations, which are often preferable to public exchanges of polemical arguments. It cannot but regret that those efforts have not prompted the Ad hoc Committee to adopt a more realistic and pragmatic approach. It is, of course, comforting, intellectually, to repeat that the ball is in the camp of the nuclear Powers alone. It is easy to affirm that they could, if they so decided, disregard the differences in situation that

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exist both between themselves and between non-nuclear-weapon States and conclude what would be a legally binding agreement, but one based on a unilateral obligation. The reality, however, is far from being that simple. Here, too, even if the international situation is changing, certain principles remain immutable for all, whether nuclear-weapon States or not, and the most fundamental of them is that of the non-use of force except in cases of legitimate self-defence. No security system, not even one based on the existence of nuclear weapons, can disregard this principle, which it is incumbent on all States to respect. I trust that our future discussions on this subject will take that into account.

There is, lastly, a related area, that of nuclear non-proliferation, which, indeed, concerns disarmament, but also the development of harmonious co-operation between all the States interested in the development of civilian applications of nuclear energy.

I shall confine myself today to restating briefly the reasons which led us to respond to the invitation extended to us to be represented as observers at the Fourth NPT Review Conference in three weeks' time. We wished to show our interest in the important international discussions that will take place on the occasion of this meeting, especially with the prospect of the conference to be convened by the States parties, in 1995, to decide, 25 years after its entry into force, on the future of the Treaty itself, all the provisions of which we apply. We shall, for our part, continue to work for the achievement of the broadest possible consensus in favour of an equitable and stable non-proliferation régime based, in particular, on the indispensable balance between non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of civilian applications of the atom.

Leaving the field of nuclear matters, I now come to outer space. The turn taken this year by the debates in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, chaired efficiently by Ambassador Shannon of Canada, is altogether encouraging. Of course, we, like many others, found it regrettable that in the spring a sterile procedural debate should have delayed unduly the beginning of the substantive work. We hope, however, that lessons have been drawn from that for the future. With respect to substance, we note with interest that the Ad hoc Committee continued and developed its efforts to increase mutual understanding of the positions of its members and of the various technical or strategic aspects of the question.

The Committee heard an unprecedented number of presentations by experts from delegations from all the groups in the Conference. Those contributions have brought out a number of useful pointers for the future of our work.

The first is that, on the subject of preventing an arms race in space, one has to beware of Manichaean simplifications and hasty constructions. Thus, before elaborating legal rules, for example on the prohibition or limitation of anti-satellite weapons, it is essential to undertake a precise analysis both of the possibilities offered by such weapons in a strategic context and of the various constraints that they are likely to encounter. This preliminary stage is indispensable for the establishment, when the time comes, of an effective, lasting régime.

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The second is that the quasi-monopoly of the two great Powers in this sphere and the inevitable links between anti-satellite systems and anti-missile systems mean that the consideration of this subject cannot be disconnected from the bilateral negotiations.

The third, and for us the most interesting point is that everyone better appreciates today the increased risks that result from the development of space activities and technological innovation for the security of satellites. This awareness is leading a growing number of delegations in the Committee to call for an approach based on increasing confidence and transparency, possibly combined with an international management instrument, such as the trajectography centre proposed by France. We welcome this and we hope that the Ad hoc Committee will be able to continue along this path and will manage to define better still the modalities for strengthening the space protection régime. For reasons of general, and not just military security, the day will come, sooner than is generally thought, when we shall see the appointment of "space traffic controllers" playing a comparable role to air traffic controllers in civil aviation now.

The approach aimed, not at eliminating existing weapons, but at preventing new weapons appearing is also that which inspires the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons chaired by Ambassador Varga of Hungary. With respect to radiological weapons stricto sensu, my delegation welcomes the fact that, after years of marking time, the work of Contact Group A was stepped up somewhat this year, thanks, in particular, to the efforts of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany. The discussions often revealed a new realism which made it possible to prepare compromise texts, in particular on the preamble and scope of the convention, on peaceful uses and on verification and compliance. My delegation tried to contribute to these developments. I must express regret, however, that this progress was countered, if not wiped out, by moves backward, by attempts to divert the convention from its objective and introduce elements which are alien to it. Here, too, our work can only progress in clarity: it is not by trying to impose constraints in this way on nuclear weapons that it will be possible to prevent the appearance of radiological weapons. Such abuse of procedure is bound to jeopardize the very promising prospects for agreement which emerged at this session.

With respect to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, my delegation, as is well known, does not participate in the work of Contact Group B. France considers that this subject falls within the ambit of the humanitarian law of conflicts, since it is dealt with in the Additional Protocols of 1977, to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. To entrust this subject to the Conference on Disarmament was, in our view, not only contrary to the Conference's mandate, but also doomed to failure, a failure that is patent today in view of the gap between delegations' positions. In this connection, we noted with interest the suggestion made on 10 July in plenary by the representative of the USSR, Mr. Batsanov: why not draw the lesson from this deadlock and leave to an appropriate forum the task of resuming work on this question, taking into account the work done in the Conference? Once that forum is found, we, for our part, will be prepared to contribute in the most active fashion to defining an immunity régime for nuclear facilities.

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I now come to chemical disarmament, which was once again the subject of intensive work, thanks to the very active chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, with the assistance of his delegation, thanks to the work of the chairmen of the various Groups, Mr. Lamazière of Brazil, Mr. Shahbaz of Pakistan, Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands and Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic and thanks, lastly, to the secretariat team led by Mr. Bensmail. I should like to take this opportunity to thank them all.

The efforts were untiring, with the mixture of patience and boldness without which it is not possible to draw along the inevitably complex whole that the Committee represents. The work was of high quality, delegations spoke in greater numbers, with more contributions by non-member countries, we derived still greater benefit than in the past from the contributions of the experts and we developed a precise and mutually enriching dialogue with the experts from industry.

And yet many agree today, with concern, that the negotiations seem to be hesitating before the major choices that still have to be made. Such a situation is not surprising; it is part of the difficulties inherent in the closing weeks of the session when, on each of the points dealt with during the year, a formal decision has to be taken to include the results in the "rolling text".

The difficulty is that this time the hesitation is lasting longer than usual and concerns a number of fundamental elements of the draft convention. But this, again, is no cause for surprise. Each delegation must be able to express its views, and the sooner the better. The negotiations have suffered too long from silence, dilatoriness and ambiguity. It is in the interests of all that all the cards should be placed on the table. Discussion cannot be suspended when a question has been clearly put, and that goes for all subjects, without exception. On the other hand, restarting from zero each time is impossible. In each of the important debates which have marked the development of the negotiations, and there has been no shortage of them, resolving the problems, achieving a compromise acceptable to all the parties and in keeping with the general trend of the negotiations, has meant starting from the work already accomplished - especially since the establishment of the "rolling text".

That text is, in effect, our memory, with all that that implies: continuity; a single reference framework; the structure, order and status of the texts, but still more perhaps, internal coherence between the various parts of this complex document, a coherence without which the convention would only be a collection of more or less disparate chapters.

Thus the inquiring mood which has affected the Committee in recent weeks should be neither dramatized nor underestimated. To our mind, things must be looked at, now and always, from the viewpoint of the completion of the convention, the only one which has any sense for us since the Paris Conference, which imposes on us an obligation of result. It is, indeed, becoming more and more clear that all the major questions now being asked or revived are closely interlinked and cannot, therefore, be resolved by this or that compromise or particular expedient, on a case-by-case basis. They can

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only be resolved by general intensification of the negotiations, which implies resort to political choices. Far from discouraging us, this analysis of the situation should lead us to the obvious conclusion: the negotiations must now be advanced, by a political decision, into their final phase, which will be next year's session. It is with this in mind that I would now like rapidly to go through the main points on which a decision is required.

First, nothing is more important than verification, and inspection on request determines the system as a whole; we are all agreed on that. The debate is now reduced to the essentials and it is time to accept the full consequences of our choices. We have to decide between two things. Either inspection under article IX, the keystone of the system, is triggered without any precondition, and that is certainly the obvious meaning of the very general phrase "at any time and anywhere" which requires no qualification of any kind; the inspection then proceeds according to the mandate, with recourse, as necessary, to the formula of controlled access, which enables full account to be taken of the security interests of the inspected State. At any rate the parties are assured of obtaining the results for which inspections are intended, that is the collection, first and foremost of facts. Or inspection is subject to a precondition, a priori according to a particular general criterion to be established independently of the conditions on the spot, and the inspection changes nature, even before it has begun, to become an exchange of arguments carried out either in capital cities or at the headquarters of the Organization or at the point of entry to the country inspected or around a facility perimeter - in short, negotiation carried out in difficult circumstances, and not a procedure of fact-finding.

In our view, it is clear that the latter approach can only multiply the obstacles and empty of its substance the raison d'etre of the procedure under article IX, namely the determination in all circumstances of whether or not there has been a militarily significant violation of the convention. If in certain cases it is from the outset impossible to obtain such an assurance, the whole verification system is called in question.

An in-depth debate within the Committee is therefore essential, and if possible in the two weeks that remain to us before the transmission of the groups' reports, since as things stand the decisions to be taken on the Chairman's text of article IX can only be provisional arrangements. We shall at least go away with clearer ideas about our respective positions, instead of being left with the past few days' inconclusive exchanges of views on questions of terminology which are not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.

Similarly, the debate should continue on the question of ad hoc inspections, which are a response to practical questions stemming directly from the results of a large number of trial inspections carried out in more than 20 countries. The question is thus clearly a real one, and I do not see what we would gain by saying that the debate is unnecessary or does not suit certain people. If I may put it this way, the facts are even more obstinate than the delegations which brought up the question of ad hoc verification before the Committee.

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I would like to conclude on this topic by remarking that a certain number of questions and objections concerning provisions currently established or proposed in the "rolling text", concerning verification in its various forms, show that each country would be well advised to carry out on its own account one or even several national trial inspections, particularly an inspection on request, and even better, to report to the Committee on the matter.

Perhaps this would be a way of moving the discussion forward. Experiments, trial measures, are not, of course, the whole answer. We are aware of the political stakes inherent in any verification system and it is taking them fully into account that the whole system has been built up, with the guarantees and counterbalances that characterize it. But the way things are now, we shall, unless we base ourselves on concrete, shared experience, remain at the stage of a theoretical discussion incapable of yielding progress.

With respect to the principles and order of destruction, the incorporation of the Soviet-United States agreement in the text of the convention means that we now have for articles IV and V and their annexes a structure that is clear, precise and acceptable to the great majority of delegations. My delegation has stressed this point too often during the past five years - and for long amid general indifference - not to bid due welcome to this vital result. Group B, which has been extremely productive, has also clarified the definitions of article II and resolved the thorny issue of the guidelines for Schedule 1.

But I would like to dwell for a moment on the bilateral American-Soviet agreement. It has been recently the subject of rather excessive criticism which may lead to its misappreciation. Let us begin by recognizing that we owe to it the beginnings of a solution on a major question of the order of destruction; next let us acknowledge that this agreement, far from setting up a parallel or competing régime relative to the convention, is arranged in accordance with that instrument and aims at anticipating its effects for the two signatories; lastly, the effect of the agreement is to end the chemical-weapons production programmes of the two declared possessors. Who today is prepared to take on a comparable commitment among the producing countries, either presumed or potential, and which have so far declared nothing with respect to their real capacities? It seems to us then, in short, that we should keep a sense of proportion here. The so-called 2-per-cent question is a delicate one, it is true, but I see that the two signatories to the agreement recognize themselves that the solution they are proposing is imperfect in comparison with the convention. Since we are all seeking universality, let us try to find together, on the basis of this proposal and others the means to ensure the adherence of all countries to the convention.

The legal questions have both advanced and become more important. For the first time, we have a practical, coherent procedure for amending the convention. We should therefore draw the necessary consequences from the situation and adopt it in Appendix I. We have also made progress on the peaceful settlement of disputes by clearly leaving the choice to States and by spelling out the role of the Executive Council. Things are less well advanced as regards sanctions, and that is not surprising, since the Committee only took up this question last year; but we have, nevertheless, made very good

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progress in drawing up the guidelines to serve as a basis for the drafting of the relevant article. At the same time, the question of the relationship between the convention and the 1925 Protocol, that is, of usage, is of growing importance and must be handled with all the requisite tact. It is, to be sure, regrettable that not all delegations are of exactly the same opinion on this point. But is the case a unique one? Is it a reason for retreating into an all-or-nothing attitude? For my part, I prefer to see in it an obligation for all delegations to seek together the means of linking two legal instruments that, while they are very different, are both, for reasons peculiar to each of them, essential and that go in the same direction.

This kind of balanced approach has shown its worth on another highly controversial subject, that of assistance, for which Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina has consolidated remarkably the first bases that were laid last year. A real compromise is now possible for the purposes of finalizing article X. Let us take this opportunity which has been patiently developed from contrary approaches. It concerns an important, sensitive subject of exemplary value.

Similarly, we are convinced that a compromise is possible today with a little effort on all sides, with regard to article XI on economic and technological co-operation.

This leads me to the very useful dialogue that we had recently with representatives of industry on confidentiality and product lists. We moved beyond exchanges of views setting two contradictory approaches against each other to recognize together that between the present stage and the full implementation of the convention well planned transitions will enable the convention to be adapted, to some extent, to the realities of industry without sacrificing the prime imperative of the security of States parties.

Lastly, it should be noted that no progress has been possible during this session on institutional matters, especially for the Executive Council, which cannot be left, as some believe, to the last quarter of an hour or worse still, until after the convention. It would be too easy and perhaps fatal for the proper functioning of the future Organization. There cannot be a good convention without clearly defined institutions.

May I add at the end of the list another question that is still unresolved, that of old chemical weapons, which has been very disappointing? The first round of consultations held in the spring gave hope that it would be possible to establish directions. But since then that initial result has dwindled and the substantive treatment of this still uncertain subject will have to be postponed. But I would draw from this a more general lesson which applies both to the historic sequels of old conflicts and to certain regional situations to which some are too ready to refer in order to establish a link between chemical disarmament and nuclear disarmament. You cannot ask the convention to settle questions that are not within its purview, whether these are unsettled consequences of past wars or current regional crises.

Having thus rapidly reviewed the main topics, I come back to what I said at the outset about the general hesitation which seems to have taken hold of the Committee to try to understand the situation in which we now find

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ourselves: the negotiations are at once coming to maturity and seizing up and it is no longer possible to deal with questions on a case-by-case basis. What we have is, so to speak, a vehicle that is both advancing and going backwards, and this situation cannot last. Preparations must therefore be made to deal with the main topics together, and that can only come about through a collective political approach. It seems to us that the time has come to resort to the formula of a ministerial conference, but taking care to spell out the conditions of it very clearly, because the undertaking would be pointless unless it led to the conclusion of the negotiations.

We therefore propose that the Conference begin its next session in January 1991 by meeting at the ministerial level to examine the status of the negotiations at that time, identify the approaches needed to complete them, set a relatively short time-limit and give the corresponding instructions to delegations. The latter would then get down to work with the conclusion of a final agreement clearly in mind and would negotiate under the ministers' direct control. Then, when the time came, the ministers would return to Geneva to settle the final outstanding points requiring a decision at their level and to sign the final text of the convention.

It goes without saying that these two ministerial meetings, which would conform in all respects with the working conditions and procedures peculiar to the Conference on Disarmament, would be open to all the countries wishing to participate in the final phase of the work as non-member States. There must be no political or material limit that could be used against a country wishing to contribute to the negotiations, as was explicitly agreed on the occasion of the Paris Conference, and the experience of the past two years has shown how the Conference has been able to accept a growing number of non-member countries.

I know that it has been proposed, with a comparable concern for universality, that a meeting of this kind should be held in the context of the United Nations. But the negotiations cannot be re-opened elsewhere, and still less split into two; that would, in our view, be to ensure failure. It should also be recalled that the Conference on Disarmament is responsible for carrying these negotiations through to the end and the United Nations General Assembly does not fail to remind it of that each year. Lastly, a precise political mandate was entrusted to us by the 149 participants in the Paris Conference with a view to completion of the negotiations without delay. The time has come to draw all the consequences from this and to assume our responsibilities together.

What we have to do between now and the ministerial overture that we and other countries, in particular the German Democratic Republic, Australia and the Netherlands, are proposing is relatively simple. It is immediately to publish as many agreements as possible in Appendix I to the "rolling text" and where that is not possible, to preserve unchanged the latest results of the work that has been done in order to take them up again intensively in mid-November at what should be virtually a plenary session of the Committee. The Committee would then prepare the new version of the report that would serve as a basis for the meeting of ministers and the final phase of negotiations.

(Mr. Morel, France)

This has, I admit, been a very long review of the situation. I tried to put in from time to time something to keep up my colleagues' interest. At any rate, the review confirms, in our opinion, that the Conference must draw the consequences from the changes that have occurred and seize the opportunities open to it to develop still further its rightful role. It has the means to do so and the consultations undertaken successfully by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan on improving the functioning and efficacy of the Conference have just given us proof of that. I would simply mention a few points to which we attach importance and on most of which there is already consensus.

The restructuring of the schedule for the annual session into three parts should give our work a more active rhythm and facilitate the parallel consultations which are so necessary to any progress. At the same time, it must be recognized that the choice of seven weeks for two of the three parts is an absolute minimum and will require serious preparatory work in national capitals and then a very fast start if we want to make efficient use of the new arrangement. Maintaining the rule of consensus for any decision will provide everyone with a guarantee that their concerns will be taken into consideration, even if the search for consensus involves by definition a sense of compromise. The reduction in the number of plenary meetings will make it possible to concentrate on effective work in the subsidiary bodies and will impose a certain discipline as regards general statements. The agenda of the Conference ought to be designed in such a way as to prevent the Conference moving away, against the tide of history, from negotiation proper to become a mere deliberating body. Non-member States should be encouraged to make full use of the extensive possibilities open to them under the rules of procedure as regards their participation in the work of the Conference. The rules do, indeed, offer practical means that too many delegations have yet to exploit. Very often it is just a matter of overcoming a psychological barrier and taking better advantage of all the opportunities there are to make a more active contribution to our work. Lastly, we should continue to seek the simultaneous admission of all those who apply to attend.

I have tried to show how we can take advantage of the opportunity now open to us in order to get multilateral disarmament under way again, not artificially, but in response to the needs of our time. Perhaps it will be necessary to mobilize the resources of the Conference a little more and to set ourselves, step by step, more precise objectives. But is it possible to do otherwise, that is, to continue as if nothing had happened? We are all participants together in a great undertaking which is often difficult, sometimes disappointing and always complicated. It does, however, enable us to prepare the world of tomorrow, in which the methods of multilateral disarmament will make it possible to prevent and manage, worldwide, what are already being called "major risks". In point of fact, the chemical weapons negotiations show us that this is just what we must do as of now, and urgently.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France, His Excellency Ambassador Morel, for the statement he has just made, for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and for his expressions of sympathy and encouragement regarding developments in my country. I assure him that his message has been understood. I believe that Ambassador Morel's statement goes beyond strictly technical concerns with regard to disarmament in the narrow sense. His Excellency placed the debate within our Conference

(The President)

in a global political and strategic context at the same time as he set out a philosophy of security and disarmament and a very pertinent synthesis of our work during this year's session. I would particularly like to draw attention to his comments concerning the negotiating of the "rolling text" of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are all the more significant as they come from the architect of the Paris Conference on chemical weapons. I am sure that delegations will have noted Ambassador Morel's exposition of the idea of a ministerial conference to conclude the negotiations on the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like to express to you my delegation's pleasure at seeing you presiding over the Conference during what is a particularly complex month, since it marks the end of a session that began with great expectations, expectations which we will now have to carry over to 1991. We are also grateful for the message from the Romanian Foreign Minister and shall study it with all the attention it deserves. I would also like to thank my colleague and friend, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, for having given me his place on the list of speakers and allowed me to take the floor so that I may, when I have finished this statement, preside over the open-ended consultations on article X of the draft convention on chemical weapons in my capacity as a friend of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

It is a happy consequence of the present international situation, especially of the East-West climate, that expressions such as "change", "new atmosphere" and "new détente" are gradually losing their novelty to become the reflection of a world that has changed in the past 10 months, perhaps far more than we realize. Yes, we say that the world has changed. But, because of the sluggishness engendered in our attitudes by long years of costly and sterile confrontations, the actual change often goes no further than its mere enunciation. It is true that, in the complex world of power balances, and particularly in the area of security, change has to be measured by the yardstick of its effects. To replace the status quo with something new is always a difficult step to take. The comforting tepidity of the status quo, to put it thus, reassures some leaders and bolsters the aversion to change there always is on the part of those who are called upon to implement policies or to imagine the alternatives that a new situation requires.

If I have dared to provide this rather abstract introduction, it is because I sincerely believe that it is of value for the process of collective reflection that the new circumstances require for the handling of item 6 of our Conference's agenda, that is, "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", or, to use the short, though no less obscure title, "Negative security assurances".

We are all aware that on this topic, as on other items of its agenda, this organ is struggling in an impasse which has prevailed for many years, without any sign so far of a possibility of concrete progress in the search

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for what we have all agreed we must seek: a common formula that will adequately guarantee to those of us who do not possess nuclear weapons against their use by those who do have them. Year after year the debates have followed a well-known scenario in which, with the sole exception of one nuclear-weapon State, the remaining four have expressed their willingness to give certain guarantees contingent upon the presence, or absence, of conditions set for countries' eligibility to enjoy such assurances. We all know the versions of each of the declarations. Some are linked with existing international legal instruments, some make reference to the possibility of an attack or aggression in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State or against another State with which the State concerned has some sort of security agreement. Some are more and some are less qualified, but they are all conditional. Furthermore, some of these declarations seem to suggest permissible scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons.

The resulting picture, it must be admitted, could not be more confusing or disjointed. The epithet "absurd" could perhaps be added if account is taken of the trends that appear to be prevailing in the international climate.

This has been said many times in the past and it is not my delegation's intention to revert now to matters that should already be part of history. But what cannot be ignored is the indisputable fact that, since the nuclear-weapon States first issued their unilateral assurances, something very important has changed in the world. My delegation, in saying this, is convinced that, if there is an issue on which the positive effects of the new international atmosphere of co-operation and rationality should be felt in a tangible and uncontraversial manner in the Conference on Disarmament, it ought to be item 6 of our agenda, namely negative security assurances.

As is well known, the unilateral declarations were made in the period between 1978 and 1982. There is no need for me to describe why it is obvious that the circumstances and the international environment in which those declarations were uttered are diametrically opposed to the present climate. What resemblance is there between the world of the "new cold war" of the early 1980s and the world of a united Germany, a "pan-European security framework", a world of treaties such as the INF or START agreements or of the virtual operational dismantling of one of the military alliances in Europe or, even more, of the search for a redefinition in political terms of what were until yesterday vast structures prepared for war, to mention only a few examples?

Only a few days ago, the Heads of State or Government who took part in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5 and 6 July issued the London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance. In the Declaration a number of important considerations are presented, starting with the affirmation in paragraph 1 that the Atlantic Alliance will adapt to the new realities. Other points of similar or even greater relevance emerged from the London meeting, such as the possibility of the adaptation of concepts like "forward defence" or even - far more significantly, from the standpoint of our body - the idea of considering nuclear weapons truly "weapons of last resort". The USSR, for its part, has welcomed these announcements through an official communiqué from its Foreign Ministry.

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In view of all this, we find it really surprising that we should be told that, as regards non-nuclear-weapon States, the instructions of the past are to remain unchanged, that today, when hands are reaching out towards yesterday's enemies, and even though each side still possesses enough nuclear warheads to wipe all trace of life from the Earth many times over, those of us who do not possess nuclear weapons cannot have our security reinforced through an acceptable agreement on unqualified negative security assurances.

This is not to imply that the assurances must be provided here and now. We are ready to analyse the details and the forms they could take. After all, that is why we have an Ad hoc Committee under the patient and constructive guidance of our distinguished friend, the Ambassador of Italy. What seems impossible to understand is that nothing should be changing for the Conference on Disarmament in this field when the events at which we have barely hinted in this intervention are taking place.

The world is changing at a pace that demands of us daily efforts to adjust frames of mind and once useful interpretations of reality that are simply no good any more. In the meantime, the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances seems inescapably doomed to repeating that, beyond an agreement to seek a common formula, there is little that 40 nations have to offer the international community. We refuse to perpetuate such inaction.

These comments are intended merely as an attempt to look at an old, familiar problem with eyes that have read the London Declaration or the proposals of the Warsaw Pact, eyes convinced of the fact that security, the new security, is only conceivable on a global scale.

Before concluding, I would like to refer briefly to item 4 of our agenda, namely the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons. The final stage of the negotiation of the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons requires from us all a series of additional efforts to continue fostering the balance and coherence of the draft convention and to accelerate the negotiating process. At the same time, we are of the view that all the States committed, like mine, to the successful conclusion of the negotiations, must focus with particular emphasis on the practical aspects of the convention, and on the attributes of those future mechanisms, in order to ensure its effectiveness.

In that context, and with the intention of keeping properly abreast of the negotiations at this crucial stage and laying the foundations for the operation of the convention in our country, the President of Argentina has recently set up, by Decree No. 1252, the Commission for the Study of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The fact that the Commission has been created by a decision of the executive branch rather than through recourse to lower-level administrative procedures is clear proof of the interest and expectations there are in the highest organs of my Government with regard to the successful conclusion of these multilateral negotiations and the immediate entry into force, with the widest possible membership, of the resulting instrument.

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The Commission's functions include the analysis of the various issues involved in implementing the convention. Among its purposes is, therefore, the making of a nation-wide inventory of the points relevant to the draft convention in order to evaluate them and to formulate the necessary recommendations.

Finally, I would like to stress that the Commission will be the necessary bridge towards the establishment of the National Authority to be set up in conformity with article VII of the draft convention. This will ensure the dissemination of knowledge of the provisions of the draft among the sectors concerned and facilitate the elaboration of the legal and administrative procedures necessary for the effective implementation of the convention as soon as it comes into force.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador García Moritán, for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I particularly thank him for his words concerning the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania. I am sure that delegations will have understood the subtle nuances of his brief but meaningful statement.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Králik.

Mr. KRALIK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) (translated from French): Mr. President, permit me to wish you good luck and good health in the discharge of the office you have just assumed. I am certain that your youth will contribute to the success of our meetings as much as the experience of your predecessors brought the Conference to the present stage of consensus and mutual understanding.

This is the first time for me to take the floor in this forum. It is true that Ambassador Kamal, in bidding me welcome, honoured me with the appellation "un vieux de la vieille de Genève" or, in English, "an old hand in Geneva". But a 20-year interval is too long for a diplomat, however sharp he may once have been, not to have need of experienced mentors and friends. I have found them in the persons of Ambassadors Morel, Ledogar and Shannon and of a friend, Sergei Batsanov, who have helped me to find my way around and get through my teething troubles in this disarming family. My thanks and compliments are due to the representatives of the countries of our neighbours, to Ambassador Sujka, Ambassador Varga, Ambassador Dietze and Ambassador von Wagner.

I was born and grew up as a European and that is why I have accepted with gratitude the wise counsel of the representatives of ancient cultures geographically remote from me, the wise counsel of Ambassador Donowaki, Ambassador Hou and Ambassador Chadha, and of Ambassador Elaraby, my neighbour, and Ambassador Bosch, the spokesmen of countries that are currently striving to remedy the same difficulties that recently confronted the nations comprising the present State entities within the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

(Mr. Králik, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

Last, but not least, permit me also to thank two members of our family who by language and temperament are very close to me, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and Ambassador Kosin.

(continued in English)

It was Napoleon who claimed that "geography determines the fate of every nation". My country lies in the heart of Central Europe, so it is no wonder that its geographical location has for 2,000 years brought us grief as well as joy. From Roman times, important trade routes crossed in Central Europe, which broadened the horizons of the nations which make up our country through culture and brought economic progress from other countries and nations. But many bloodthirsty raids and destructive wars were also waged across our land. Yet, in addition to death, even these brought something positive. They taught us to cherish peace and co-operation on an equal basis among States. So it is these attributes of multilateral diplomacy whose inevitability has been proclaimed by Czechoslovak delegations within these premises of the League of Nations with the same vigour as I would like to emphasize at this forum in the name of my delegation.

The Czechoslovak delegation is in full accord with the opinion stated at this forum on several occasions that, together with Europe itself, this disarmament Conference too is living through a time of renaissance. One of the phenomena of every renaissance is the effort to renew that which formed the integrity of classical culture, ending that which supported the pagan and barbarian practices of "divide and rule". Therefore in this forum too we must see to it that the invented doctrine of "balance of fear", which drove Europe into the cold war and drove my country into intellectual and material isolation, is replaced by an effort to create a new social and legal space imbued with the ideals of human rights and to build mutual trust. The most recent experiences in Europe prove at the same time that this kind of space can emerge even if there are no "blocs", in harmony with the ideal of institutionalizing international relations and in an atmosphere of co-operation among States, but never in an atmosphere of suspicion and confrontation.

The thousand-year-old heritage of our European civilization is being enriched at the present time with new knowledge. Neither by "Europe in us" nor by "we in Europe" will we be able to exist alone in a world joined together by satellites, without widely developed friendly relationships with those nations and States which fate has decreed should live on other continents. Nevertheless, I would like to assure this international forum that as far as our relations with other States are concerned, one single criterion applies for us. It is what our "tutor of nations", Jan Amos Comenius, passed on to us: "... the wisdom and valour of nations is not expressed by the power of weapons, but by the power and strength of the entirety of useful knowledge".

Allow me to put forward, from the standpoint of this criterion, our position on those questions which deserve the closest attention and greatest effort on the part of all regions represented at this Conference. These are in particular items 1, 4 and 5. I wholeheartedly concur with the opinion of

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several other delegations that in order to make substantial progress this Conference must concentrate its efforts on a smaller number of agenda items. I highly value the consensus of all the participants in this room for a renewal of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Our delegation is particularly pleased by this because the Committee began its work on the basis of the draft mandate proposed by Czechoslovakia in 1988. We look forward to seeing this Committee, in keeping with its mandate, contribute towards achieving that long-anticipated goal - a general and total ban on nuclear weapons testing. In this context, we want to express our conviction that the global ban on nuclear testing is the most effective measure on the path to the total elimination of that "inheritance of Satan", humankind's immense nuclear arsenal. And not just that. This ban also represents a stable barrier against the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. We believe that the work of this Committee is directed toward determining concrete aspects of the nuclear test ban. In this respect, the amendment conference to the PTBT, to be held in New York next January, will certainly make a contribution. The broadening of the scope of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 to include underground explosions too closes the logical circle of nuclear testing. In this connection, we want to express our support for the view that it would be very appropriate to limit the possibilities for simply exchanging military explosions for detonations for peaceful purposes by making this ban also cover the latter.

All aspects of nuclear testing, as well as nuclear disarmament in general, will take on much greater dimensions also in view of the forthcoming Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This Treaty is an indivisible part of the support mechanism for international security. We therefore are against any kind of weakening of the spirit and letter of the Treaty, or its depreciation. On the contrary, we are prepared to share in helping to make it as effective as possible. We are fully aware that proliferation of the nuclear weapons arsenal, especially in regions of crisis, would mean a serious danger for world peace and strategic stability. As in other areas of priority in the disarmament process, we need mutual trust, effective verification and understanding. We also need this because the general easing of the international atmosphere, anticipated by the successful conclusion of the Soviet-American START talks and the conference on conventional armed forces in Europe, are a springboard for reinforcing changes in the strategic security concept of military-political blocs. In this connection, we can in the future look forward to an impulse also in the field of negative security assurances. There is, it is true, a certain "Yes, but ..." to think about. Let's consider a parallel. The saying goes in circles concerned with international law that multilateral diplomacy is undeniably able to "lead a herd of elephants to the river, but it can't make them drink". Like other figures of speech, however, not even this one - regardless of its truth - is absolutely valid. You can, it is true, lead only thirsty elephants to the river - or else (and this is the better solution) you can make even water so attractive for everybody that they all begin to imbibe it voluntarily. So let us all make an effort together to look for those attractive elements which will accommodate all the delegations, assuming reasonable compromises.

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For quite a long while we have been simply marking time in the question of preventing the arms race in outer space. We have a high regard for the work of those experts who have provided the Committee with such a great amount of information, of intricate calculations, and photographs from all kinds of satellites. Certainly all this is very instructive for many, but the real results of the Committee are more or less symbolic.

Nevertheless, we believe that the Committee should keep its finger on the pulse of all space activities as they develop. This is not just for technical reasons, but from the political and negotiating standpoints. The need for a realistic assessment and solution of the real problems which exist should preoccupy not only the big space Powers. Preventing the militarization of space and transforming it for wide peaceful purposes are very general concepts. So far, conditions have not been created which would allow a complex discussion of these questions. However, we can direct ourselves toward more modest goals. One of these would be to work out a round of measures for building mutual confidence. There has been a lot of talk about this, but not very much has been done so far. Let us try to direct the efforts of our experts in this direction.

A second area could be working out a kind of data base on the launching of satellites and the collection and classification of technical data. For this purpose, it would be a good idea to establish a scientific centre whose work could be shared among scientists in different parts of the world. The more information and the more experiences and the more opportunity for comparisons, the more could be built to contribute to deeper and more widespread co-operation, putting into practice the idea that space is a value common to all humankind. At the same time, let us not forget what Aristotle said: "Everything that has already happened, can happen again". This planet could certainly not survive a chain of Chernobyls in space.

The field in which most attention is focused and in which we have made most progress, although the ongoing talks might not indicate this, is the outlawing of chemical weapons. One of the most discussed questions is the problem of control.

Systematic verification under the chemical weapons convention will only cover facilities which have been declared by the State parties. However, prohibited activities might occur at facilities which have not been declared or were declared, but not as subject to international monitoring. To assure full compliance with the projected convention, additional verification methods are discussed. In case of serious suspicion or allegation of a breach of the chemical weapons convention, challenge inspection might be applied. In principle, challenge inspection can be applied to both military and civilian facilities. To learn the practical problems of this type of inspection, many States participating in the Conference on Disarmament have made trial challenge inspections at both civilian and military facilities. Challenge inspection has both political and technical aspects. Czechoslovakia believes that challenge principles on the base of its obligatory character, without right of refusal, any time, anywhere and at short notice, are in agreement with its previous statements. The technical aspects of challenge might be solved on a practical level by evaluation of real experiences from national

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experimental challenge inspections. Czechoslovakia agrees with the proposal of the United Kingdom to conduct national challenge inspections by a number of countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament, as was suggested in United Kingdom documents CD/921 and CD/1012.

This challenge inspection - now inspection on request - was conducted in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at the beginning of July. I am now submitting to this disarmament Conference two documents, CD/1021 and CD/1022. One of these is concerned with the inspection of a military facility and the second is concerned with the inspection of a civilian chemical plant. Our experiences, which are summarized in the conclusions of both documents, could be of some importance for further negotiations in this field. However, a very important conclusion - and that is why I am reiterating our support for having as many States as possible conduct their own trial inspections - stems directly from this for every State and that is that this will point out the many questions or difficulties which will have to be solved by its joining the convention. It will show what technical, legal, personnel, military and other problems will arise for a given State when the convention enters into force.

Let me, in addition, express my personal opinion on this question: Talleyrand has already pointed out that "war is much too serious a thing to be left only to military men". Therefore it is very good that all these technical questions which have been discussed in the framework of the convention on chemical weapons are being verified in practice, at least partially, by so many experts. It is not just a challenge inspection, but there are also, for instance, a whole range of national trial inspections which have been carried out by many countries which have taken part in the Conference on Disarmament in past years. There is also the Finnish initiative about an inter-laboratory round-robin test, along with many other programme These practical experiences open the way to compromise solutions within the text of the future convention.

I believe that this Conference is taking place at the right place, at the right time and with the right people. The place is not changing, the people are coming and going, but time is running out. It would be a pity for humankind if this right time were lost.

In conclusion, may I quote a witty Irishman who did not know about the disarmament Conference, but who defined its orientation very accurately: "When we look backwards, we tip our hats and when we look forward, we roll up our sleeves".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Králik, for his statement and his kind and encouraging words concerning the Chair. I see in what was said by Ambassador Králik in French a further sign of his friendship for the French-speakers in the Conference: (continued in English) welcome to the French-speakers' club of Geneva, Your Excellency.

(continued in French)

I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, at the outset, let me, on behalf of the Nigerian delegation, offer you my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. We are grateful to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for the very able manner in which he discharged his onerous assignment during the month of July. May I also seize this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Rubens Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador Chadha of India and Ambassador Juraj Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

As we enter the last month of the current session, it is pertinent to make some observations on developments on the international scene, especially those that are relevant to the Conference on Disarmament. The year 1990 began with an improved international atmosphere reflecting the relaxation of tensions and the increase of confidence among States. Confrontation and years-long military conflicts are gradually giving way to political dialogue. The successful outcome of the Washington summit last May represents an important step in the reduction of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons by the super-Powers. That so much could be achieved so quickly, after leaving behind the "cold war", shows that disarmament becomes possible only after improved political relations make excessive dependence on these weapons less necessary.

My delegation welcomes the declared intention of the leaders of the two great countries to break with the past, which was characterized by fear, suspicion and mistrust. It now seems clear that the considerable measure of substantive agreement is beginning to have positive effects on a number of areas of bilateral arms limitation, and further progress will, I hope, continue to be definitive and not reversible.

While acknowledging the importance of these bilateral developments, my delegation believes that disarmament is an issue of concern to all States. Bilateral efforts should therefore complement the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum. We must ensure that the intrinsic qualities of this body are fully utilized for the purpose of securing global disarmament measures. By proclaiming the Third Disarmament Decade last May in New York, the United Nations Disarmament Commission underlined the need for the international community to seek early reduction of nuclear weapons and work towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Nuclear items which have been accorded the highest priority in our agenda have received very little attention in our work. We welcome the recent re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban after almost seven years. We are grateful to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for his tireless efforts in ensuring that the Ad hoc Committee was established. We are also grateful to his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, whose perseverance and diplomatic skills are noteworthy. We share the view expressed last Tuesday by Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt in his statement that the Committee "should also agree on a programme of work that would take into consideration the necessary elements of elaborating a framework, structure and scope of a draft treaty which should include, by definition, acceptable and verifiable means of verification and compliance". Indeed, the international community expects to see negotiations leading to a very rapid process of elimination of nuclear

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weapons. It is therefore with profound consternation that my delegation continues to hear of the supposed continuing validity of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and the intention of some nuclear-weapon States to retain nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

We are familiar with the arguments against a comprehensive test ban. My delegation appreciates the emotional and political fear and fixations about inspection and verification arrangements. But if the risk is that of daring the good faith of one another and not of mutual annihilation, it should be taken before it is too late. If the risk is not to diminish their current military capabilities, but to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons, it should be taken now. If the risk is not to challenge their present leadership roles in the world, but to enhance the performance of the primary responsibility assigned to them through the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, that risk should be taken now to ban all nuclear tests.

My delegation is encouraged to press this point because both super-Powers have hitherto always respected the agreements they have reached. We opened this session amidst further relaxation of East-West tensions and the prospects of reversing the decades of nuclear armament. As East-West tension appears to have subsided, the time is ripe for the nuclear-weapon States to extend the new spirit of co-operation to a comprehensive test ban.

My delegation is aware of the complexities of the issues involved in the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. This notwithstanding, we are greatly worried that the CD has very little to report - and this has become the rule rather than the exception - except a catalogue of discussion and more discussion - although we all recognize that a CTB is an indispensable step on the road to positive nuclear disarmament.

In three weeks' time, the Fourth Review Conference of Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a major international political event, will commence in Geneva. My delegation has always felt that the NPT, far from being an end in itself, is an important disarmament measure for all States aimed at the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Twenty years after the NPT entered into force, we note with satisfaction that more than 140 States are now parties, and we hope others will soon find themselves able to accede to the Treaty. Admittedly, two nuclear-weapon States and some threshold States without safeguard facilities are yet to be signatories, hence the lack of universality.

Let me reiterate again that the Treaty imposes rights as well as obligations on nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It is, however, becoming increasingly disturbing that, once non-nuclear-weapon States have assumed their obligations, they have been denied the economic and scientific benefits. Co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology is one area yet to be fulfilled. The activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has a vital role to play in disseminating the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, is replete with the yawning gap between the expenditure on safeguards and the expenditure on technical co-operation. The nuclear-weapon States should understand that unless a satisfactory balance

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is struck in the provisions for the IAEA to carry out its two-part mandate arising from its Statute as well as the NPT, a certain tension will continue to mark the work of the Agency. Thus, urgent steps should be taken to overhaul the present level of inadequate assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon States in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The painstaking preliminary work already done by the three Preparatory Committee meetings is an indication of the seriousness with which the Review Conference is being taken. There has been a sense of expectation arising from recent events and statements by those who are expected to give meaningful contribution towards general and complete disarmament. My delegation believes that neither the anticipation nor the expectations aroused by these encouraging statements are enough to make us feel secure or even over-optimistic. The stake is too high for complacency.

As we move towards the Fourth Review Conference, several refrains will again be heard about putting the NPT on track. These will include appeals for universal adherence; reduction of vertical proliferation and prevention of other forms of nuclear proliferation; enhancement of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology; and establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as barriers against further proliferation. As useful as these measures could be, the success of genuine and lasting non-proliferation rests on a comprehensive test ban.

Mr. President, let me now turn to the ongoing negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on chemical weapons. My delegation notes with satisfaction the tremendous resources and efforts of the Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, in ensuring continued progress. I believe that the outstanding issues in the convention can be resolved if a sense of urgency is injected into the negotiations.

This brings me to our concern for chemical weapons, which must go far beyond the periodic expressions of abhorrence about their use. After all, those who have been accused of using these weapons are not solely or even necessarily the producers. Naturally, humanitarian concern about the effect of this category of weapons of mass destruction is well and good; however, we should go beyond that and tackle the issue from the source and the maintenance of international peace and security must not rest solely on the presumption of the highest standard of behaviour by some States. If the use of chemical weapons is reprehensible, so should be their development, production, stockpiling and transfer. International emotion should not only be whipped up when there is suspected use of chemical weapons. There must be a sustained international effort to eliminate these weapons from the arsenals of those who possess them.

We have come to a crucial stage in the consideration of this agenda item. Ambassador Hyltenius's consultations on a number of issues, especially on challenge inspection, have not only helped to illuminate the very complex and sensitive nature of the issues, but are also helping the Committee to find its way, as it were, through the maze. The Chairman's proposal on challenge inspection, now christened inspection on request, has received considerable attention. Specific issues like the mandate, the role of observers, the

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powers of the Director-General, alternative measures, managed access and the report deserve mention. I will however direct my comments to two of these issues, namely, the observers and managed access.

My delegation agrees with the prevailing view that an observer should be present during an inspection. It is only his presence that can reassure the requesting State, without necessarily calling into question the impartiality and integrity of the inspection team. My delegation also endorses the view that his role is to observe the conduct of the inspection, although the extent of access he can be granted is not yet clearly defined. An observer who is not granted sufficient access will have good grounds not only to complain of, but also to reject the outcome of an inspection exercise, especially if the report indicates that no violation has taken place. An observer so affected will particularly feel aggrieved if the inspected State party denies him access. My delegation would prefer that any decision to refuse access to an observer should be left to the inspection team.

The proponents of managed access have always felt that challenge inspection, or inspection on request, should be conducted with some degree of flexibility, some leeway, for an inspection exercise could otherwise be dead-locked. It is hoped that, with managed access, the inspection team would have the access needed for effective verification, while the inspected State party would also have the protection of its national security it requires. This places a very weighty responsibility on the inspection team, which may invariably have to arrange the managed access in conjunction with the inspected State party. However, there could be a source of friction between States parties and inspection teams; to forestall such a development, there is the need to elaborate general guidelines on managed access.

Significant progress has been recorded in the elaboration of settlement of disputes and amendments. The issue of sanctions, now referred to as "measures to redress a situation", is of great interest to my delegation. Firstly, there is a need to ensure that the various organs of the Organization that will be involved in these measures are given the scope to perform their duties. In particular, the Conference of the States Parties, the highest organ of the future Organization, should be able to make recommendations when reporting to the Security Council any case of grave threat to international peace and security arising from a serious violation of the convention. My delegation does not share the view that such recommendations amount to an encroachment on the powers and prerogative of the Security Council.

Secondly, the convention needs to be fortified with provisions that will permit the adoption of swift and effective measures against any contravention of the convention and threats to States parties. My delegation therefore welcomes the provision for the Conference of the States Parties to recommend collective measures to States parties against possible violations. A provision such as this will reassure States parties of their security, attract more adherents to the convention, and enhance its universality, another area of interest to my delegation.

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Considerable attention has been given to the issue of universality of the convention. In this regard, it has been stressed that the convention must above all be non-discriminatory. My delegation agrees entirely with this view. We note with satisfaction the recent United States-Soviet bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons. The Agreement, however, does not provide for total and unconditional destruction of their chemical weapons stocks, nor the extensive verification provisions required for a global chemical weapons convention. Only complete and unconditional destruction of all stockpiles as provided for in the draft convention can ensure the universal and effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria, His Excellency Ambassador Azikiwe, for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. We all remember with what distinction and skill Ambassador Azikiwe conducted our proceedings in March this year. I am sure delegations have taken note of the concerns and ideas expressed by the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Minister Counsellor Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I am very gratified to have the floor today when you, as the representative of Romania, are assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. To your experience and skill in conducting our proceedings, I should like to add my delegation's pledge to support you as far as possible. My delegation also greatly appreciates the message addressed to the Conference by your country's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I should also like to take this opportunity to convey my sincere thanks to Ambassador Bogumil Sujka for his wise leadership throughout the month of July, of which the significant results that we achieved are a tangible expression.

I should also like to pay tribute to Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki and his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, who, by their experience and persistence, made possible the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee to deal with the topic of a nuclear test ban. We hope that, as from 1991, that Committee will be able to embark on substantive discussions concerning the structure and scope of a convention that will ban nuclear testing in all environments. To have achieved such a result after six years of untiring efforts is undoubtedly a first step in the right direction. We are convinced that rather than being the product of a specific set of circumstances, the important achievement on item 1 of our agenda is a genuine reflection of our resolve to avoid any further postponement of substantive work of the negotiation of a definitive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In this connection, my delegation hopes for a successful outcome to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts which is now meeting.

It is proper that we recall every now and then, as we frequently do, that this is the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, but we must not forget either that negotiation for the sake of negotiation is not an end in

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itself. What is required is that the great amount of good will, time and resources that we invest each year should from time to time produce concrete and positive results.

That is why I would like to refer to the work that has been going on in the context of the informal consultations led by Ambassador Kamal, since the delegation of Peru considers it particularly important to be able to try to achieve consensus on the very necessary and long overdue improvement of the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament in order to make its work effective and more timely. It is in this context that I would like to mention some of the topics that are covered by the informal consultations.

First of all, I think it imperative to resolve in a positive fashion the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We cannot conceal behind a specious procedural debate a certain lack of political will to arrive at the required increase of the number of members of the Conference. There might be, however, an interpretation according to which the "1 + 1 + 2" formula does not necessarily correspond any more to the political realities now that we are witnessing the dissolution of rigid ideological and political blocs and the world order is being redrawn in the light of new parameters affecting the North-South relationship.

For this reason, new formulas for sharing out the seats must be taken into account, even if it is assumed that in the near future some reduction may occur in the present number of members. Why, then, not consider new alternatives for an integral solution such as a 1 + 3 pattern? Further, it might be argued that a partial solution would not be the most appropriate now since, rather than helping to break the deadlock, it might generate imbalance and exacerbate the current lack of decision.

During the consultations we have supported the reorganization of the sessions so that as from next year we have three sessions of 10, 7 and 7 weeks respectively. We note with satisfaction that this new distribution would win the support of all delegations; that will make it possible, among other things, to have more pauses for the inevitable consultations and co-ordination with our respective capitals. Provided, that is, we make proposals for amendments to avoid the long and sterile discussions concerning mandates and programmes of work.

It is a good idea to leave open the possibility of having some type of activity in the inter-sessional period with a view to defining the consensus about mandates or programmes of work, but we must not lose sight of the fact that it is one thing to examine the improvement of the mandate of a pre-existing subsidiary organ and something very different to reach agreement on the mandate of a subsidiary organ that is about to be established. In the latter case, the inter-sessional work will be of the greatest importance and care must be taken to ensure that the consultations involve all the States members of the Conference.

However, concerning the first case, that is, the refinement of the mandate or the agreeing of the programme of work of an existing subsidiary organ, my delegation would like to restate the point of view it expressed at the inaugural meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 to the effect that, in

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addition to the inter-sessional work entrusted to the President of the CD, on some specific topics the chairmen of the relevant subsidiary organs might pursue their consultations in order eventually to be able to hand over to their successors a more fluid situation that would facilitate the next year's negotiations. A specific example might well be agenda item 1, on which Ambassador Donowaki could continue holding consultations during the inter-sessional period in order to have a suitable programme of work next year.

While it is certain that for the time being the rule of consensus in the CD cannot be changed, opposition to consensus on procedural matters should not be obstructionist, but positive in nature, so that no State member of the Conference can be in a position to veto or oppose the general feeling. On this matter, I think it is appropriate to emphasize the constructive attitude of some countries members of this forum, those which, despite not being in agreement with the course of the negotiations on certain topics, are not objecting to the existing consensus even though they may decide to remain outside the negotiating process for a while. We must require a similar constructive attitude from those who individually are not in harmony with the general and majority trend in the Conference.

Another question of the utmost importance for this Conference is the agenda. As I said earlier, some of the topics that appear on the agenda are directly related to the concept of blocs, which is now being superseded. For this reason, it is desirable that the agenda of the Conference should be brought into line with the fluid international situation as soon as possible, lest the present escape us, as Flaubert used to say.

Many delegations have made proposals to this effect. It is not a mistake to say how paradoxical it is that, at a time when freedom is blossoming in the world, the Conference should not be adapting to the new international circumstances through which we are living and that, if we were to persist in this attitude of not adapting to the reality, we might expose the Conference to a crisis for reasons of ossification or obsolescence.

For our part, we would like to stress that in the decalogue that underpins the agenda of this Conference we find the topic of conventional disarmament. Its importance was highlighted as long ago as during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, when the need was stressed to carry out, in parallel with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament and with the States that have the largest military arsenals bearing a special responsibility in this respect. The negotiations, it was said, should be carried out on the basis of the principle of undiminished security of the parties and promotion and enhancement of stability at a lower military level. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that conventional weapons consume more than 70 per cent of world spending on armaments; that means a tremendous drain in terms of human, technological and economical resources. These resources could be far better used if they were harnessed for the promotion of our countries' social and economic development.

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These are the considerations that have led Peru continuously to promote cessation of the conventional arms race. Important precedents that can be adduced in this respect as regards South America are the 1974 declaration of Ayacucho, or the conversations initiated in 1986 between the military authorities of Peru and Chile with the aims of confidence and reducing arms spending. I think it is also relevant to highlight the Peruvian initiative that was embodied in 1985 in resolution 40/94 A which introduces for the first time in the United Nations the concept of conventional disarmament on a regional scale. Finally, two recent precedents are to be found in the Galápagos Declaration signed by the five countries of the Andean Group and the declaration that has just been signed by the Presidents of Mexico and Guatemala with a view to achieving the limitation of conventional offensive weapons in Latin America.

All this leads us to conclude that in the present circumstances it would be highly appropriate for this Conference to include conventional disarmament in its agenda. My delegation feels that if we manage to establish a certain framework to guide disarmament policy at the conventional level, that framework might later be translated into concrete agreements to be applied regionally by interested countries.

I would now like to refer briefly to two proposals that my delegation is submitting to the Conference today within the context of the negotiations now under way in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My delegation is perfectly aware that this is not the time to embark upon a substantive discussion of new proposals. However, we hope that, with the circulation of these proposals as official documents of the Conference, there could at least be some preliminary discussion, subject to preparing more thorough analysis during the inter-sessional period and in 1991.

Before introducing the proposals, I would like to emphasize that my delegation believes that the Ad hoc Committee entrusted with the task of negotiating a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons cannot continue its work indefinitely. Next year, then, it will be necessary to set a deadline for the conclusion of its work and it will also be necessary to clarify its mandate once and for all, so that the Ad hoc Committee is also in a position to negotiate the prohibition of any type of use of chemical weapons. Because of its choice of 1991 as a time-limit, my delegation can agree with what was said by the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Morel, to the effect that the political work could well be intensified next year with a view to the prompt conclusion of the negotiations that are now under way.

The first proposal, contained in document CD/1024, refers to the environment and aims at the inclusion in the future convention of a new article referring to this important topic. In the opinion of my delegation, the underlying principle in humanity's obligation to protect its natural environment is that all human activity should be carried out without detriment to the ecological integrity of the environment. Whether it is an industrial activity or chemical recycling, it cannot disregard this fundamental principle unless it prefers to value immediate returns on investment over the quality of life.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Within the context of the future convention, there are, in the opinion of my delegation, two cases in which there may be damage to the environment. The first concerns the period of destruction, which entails the handling, transport, destruction proper and disposal of thousands and thousands of tonnes of highly toxic chemical waste. At this point, no one can deny that this involves a risk, however small, of accidents and of damage to neighbouring populations and the environment. At any rate, my country's intention is to strengthen measures to provide material security and to remind people that, when we talk about chemical disarmament, what we have in mind is not only to ban a particular type of weapons of mass destruction, but also to spare humanity the risk of seeing itself involved in a massive catastrophe as a result of error or negligence in the process of destroying these weapons.

The second case in which there might be environmental damage is that of the development of the chemical industry for purposes not prohibited by the future convention. Here we assume the most optimistic scenario, namely, scrupulous compliance with the ten-year destruction period, followed by the continued expansion and development on authorized chemical industry. However peaceful a facility's activity, the risk of accident will be present: the tragedies of Seveso and Bhopal, the consequences of which are still being felt today, are dramatic proof of that. This is why the Organization to be set up cannot remain indifferent, or on the sidelines in the case of accidents arising from the peaceful development of the chemical industry.

Lastly, the proposal suggests establishing an assistance and environmental protection fund to make possible the promotion in developing countries of prevention and environmental decontamination programmes. Running this fund would be the responsibility of the Organization.

Without looking far afield, last night I found out about the environmental questions now arising in a neighbouring country because it is apparently intended to begin building a citric acid factory there. As the world's population increases, the space available on this planet decreases and the environment becomes a very valuable asset.

To conclude, a few words about the second proposal, which appears in document CD/1025. Originally introduced by Peru in the Ad hoc Committee in 1988, this proposal, for a "clause of automatic nullity" is an updated version that we place before the Committee in connection with the issue of universality, the political implications of which call for informal treatment in the light of the objectives pursued by the future convention. My delegation believes that the fundamental requirement is to ensure that the multilateral instrument to be adopted can, right from the outset, enjoy the unanimous support of the international community, which is why it must be, among other things, non-discriminatory. For this reason, we propose that if, at the end of the ten-year period for destruction, the Organization is not in a position to declare that all the States parties have carried out the obligations specified in article I, the obligations shall cease for all States parties not possessing chemical weapons.

I would like to stress that both proposals are in addition to others and could suffer the same fate with respect to the "rolling text". We have no doubt that, in the end, the outcome of the negotiating effort will be satisfactory to everyone.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru, Minister Counsellor Calderón, for the statement that he has just made, for his kind words to the Chair and for his comments concerning the message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Romania addressed to the Conference. I would also like to thank him for introducing the two working papers tabled by the delegation of Peru today.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, let me, at the very outset, express my pleasure at seeing you preside over our deliberations during the final month of our current session. This is a crucial period and we are confident that you will be able successfully to discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. Let me assure you that my delegation and I will extend our fullest co-operation to you during the current month, as well as during the inter-sessional period.

A number of colleagues have joined us since I last took the floor in the plenary. I would like to extend a welcome to the Ambassadors of Brazil, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As we approach the end of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament I wish to address the subject of the chemical weapons convention, to which we have devoted a great amount of time and effort over the last few years and which, despite the various obstacles, continues to hold the maximum degree of promise among the various items on our agenda. The negotiations on this convention have now reached a stage where an end is in sight, but not yet quite within our grasp. The intensity of our negotiations on this subject is a reflection of the international consensus which exists on the need to ban chemical weapons, and it is our hope that this commitment on the part of the international community will be sustained till the achievement of our final goal.

Before I address some of the specific issues being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allow me to state once again that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them. Consequently, we have a deep and abiding interest in a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty that would prohibit the development, stockpiling, acquisition and use of chemical weapons and ensure the total destruction of existing stockpiles, facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons. At the same time, we would not favour any partial or discriminatory approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons, since this would leave the door open for the use of chemical weapons and discriminate against the developing countries which do not possess the capability to produce such weapons.

There is no doubt that the procedures for verification included in the convention will constitute its backbone and will be essential to provide the assurance that the obligations regarding the destruction of stockpiles and facilities and for the non-acquisition of chemical weapons are being complied with by all parties. It is also clear that verification will involve a combination of national and international means, and that international verification will, in certain circumstances, entail intrusive procedures to

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ensure compliance. Based on these assumptions, we have been developing a verification régime which has two key components, namely, routine inspection and challenge inspection. Even though our negotiations have not yet been concluded on these two systems of verification, and we are still not clear as to their final shape, we have witnessed a recent effort to introduce another element in the verification régime, to be now called by its authors ad hoc verification. Without repeating the arguments that one has heard in the Ad hoc Committee against the need for such a system, I would only like to point out at this juncture that this concept has also been debated in the past and its proponents have not been able to make out any convincing case for the injection of this third concept into the verification régime. We believe that the procedures presently being discussed are adequate, and that there is no need for another régime which could politicize the Technical Secretariat by giving it the right to initiate disguised challenge inspections against States parties. We hope that the proponents of this concept will accept the fact that there is, as yet, no agreement even on the need for a further detailed discussion of the concept of ad hoc verification in the Ad hoc Committee.

The procedures for challenge inspection will have a crucial place in an effective verification régime which would be required to deter violations, as well as to create confidence in compliance. There is general recognition that challenge inspections should be mandatory, with States having no right of refusal. However, as regards the actual conduct of the inspection, procedures still need to be evolved that will reconcile the demands of an effective inspection with the legitimate right of States to protect sensitive information and installations which are not related to chemical weapons. Moreover, the whole range of issues connected with follow-up to the submission of the inspection report still need to be addressed adequately. We believe that, once doubts have been raised publicly about compliance with the convention, the matter can no longer be regarded as one of concern only to the requesting and requested States, to be resolved by them bilaterally. Every party to the convention has an interest in seeing to it that the inspection is carried out in an effective manner and that a clear-cut finding is arrived at on compliance or otherwise. It is obvious that the Executive Council is the appropriate organ to make such a determination.

My delegation fully supports the initiative taken by Ambassador Hyltenius to arrive at some textual language for article IX, and we have been actively participating in the negotiations being conducted by him. Care has, of course, to be taken that the concerns of no States are marginalized.

The composition of the Executive Council continues to be a difficult question and, as we enter the final phase of our negotiations, there is an increasing need to address the matter. My delegation believes that the Executive Council should not be so large in size as to weaken its capacity to take decisions, nor should it be so small as to deprive it of a truly representative character. Its precise composition should be based on the geographical divisions recognized by the United Nations. We disagree with arguments calling for the establishment of an organizational set-up which would give a privileged position to the developed nations at the expense of developing countries. We realize the existing inequalities in today's world, but we cannot support their being institutionalized in an international agreement which draws its strength and validity from the basic objectives of comprehensiveness and globality.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

We share with most delegations the view that the Executive Council should consist of about 25 members. However, we also believe that the convention should provide for an increase in the membership of the Executive Council once the total number of States parties goes beyond a certain figure, or when States parties agree to expand its membership.

As the Executive Council would be the supreme political organ under the convention, it is imperative that it should have an effective decision-making mechanism. The consensus principle, by giving every member virtually the right of veto, would be a prescription for paralysis, especially in situations where decisions or actions are most required. On the other hand, a significant number of States may be reluctant to accept decisions by a simple majority, especially where substantive matters are concerned. There is also the additional question of determining what is substantive and what is procedural. The dilemma could be resolved by basing all decisions, procedural and substantive, on a qualified majority of States present and voting. Such a solution would not only be unambiguous, but would also have the merit of being simple and effective.

My delegation has taken a particular interest in articles X and XI of the convention, dealing respectively with assistance and economic and technological development. Some delegations continue to approach these matters from a rather narrow angle and see them as another North-South issue. In fact, insinuations have been voiced that these articles are being used to establish an "aid programme" under the convention. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The idea behind these two articles is closely linked to the objective of universal adherence to the convention and the strengthening of its viability. It is our belief that if States were assured that, by becoming parties to the convention, they would be able to rely on effective assistance from other States parties in the event of an attack or a threat of an attack, the incentives for adhering to the convention would be substantially increased. Conversely, a State will not become a party to the convention or, having become one, might withdraw from it unless it can count on guaranteed assurances of assistance from States parties in meeting a demonstrated threat to its security. Consequently, a provision which assures mandatory assistance to a State party subjected to an objectively verified attack or a threat of attack would go a long way in encouraging universal adherence to the convention, especially adherence by non-chemical-weapons States such as my own.

We have been participating in the consultations undertaken by Ambassador García Moritán, and we hope that we will be able to arrive at a text for article X which will adequately provide for the concerns that I have just enumerated.

The undertaking that we are seeking under article XI for the promotion of international scientific and technological co-operation is not new. Similar clauses exist in two other multilateral disarmament agreements, namely the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. The case for such a provision is all the greater in view of the generally recognized interrelationship between disarmament and development, and the increased confidence that compliance with the convention would generate.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

My delegation's views regarding the bilateral Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the qualified destruction and non-production of chemical weapons have been adequately expressed in the plenary statement made on behalf of the Group of 21 on 24 July 1990. Nevertheless, I wish to reiterate today that efforts to introduce concepts in the convention which would result in undermining its universal and non-discriminatory character and scope would be counter-productive.

In concluding, I would like to express our hope that all delegations will capitalize on the existing international consensus on the need for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. We must resist the temptation of a less-than-comprehensive ban, or of interim or discriminatory measures which can only jeopardize the existing consensus and wash away the serious work done so far. Also, an inordinate delay or too laboured a rate of progress towards a comprehensive ban could lead to an erosion of world-wide interest in the subject. Thus, the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is not only desirable, but would also provide a significant boost to the Conference on Disarmament and reinvigorate the multilateral disarmament process.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Kamal, for the statement he has just made and for his kind words and encouragement to the Chair. I am sure that delegations will have taken good note of the ideas he put forward concerning the negotiations on chemical weapons.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? That is not the case.

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for the meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. This timetable was drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be amended if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): There are no further matters to be discussed.

Before concluding, I would like to remind you that an informal meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will be held under the chairmanship of Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso immediately after this meeting.

I note with pleasure that this time the Conference has used to the full the time allotted for a plenary meeting. I am therefore now going to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 August, at 10 a.m. Thank you for your participation. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.571
7 August 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

GE.90-62522/2303B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 571st meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, in accordance with its programme of work, the Conference is beginning consideration of agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, a member may, if he wishes, speak on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

On behalf of the Conference and in my personal capacity, I would like to extend a warm welcome to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Ambassador Bruno Bottai. The visit of Ambassador Bottai, an outstanding career diplomat, who, among other things, has exercised the important functions of Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister, reflects the continuing interest that Italy attaches to the work of the Conference, which has already been honoured on several occasions by visits of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti. The Secretary-General's visit takes on particular importance since it is occurring at the time of Italy's assumption of the Presidency of the European Community for the next six months.

I would also like to welcome to the Conference the three People's Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Deputies Eduard Gams, Pyotr Tlantchuk and Sergei Tsypliaev, as well as the member of the United States Congress, Representative Martin Lancaster. Their visit constitutes a great support for our efforts, especially in view of the role they play in the decision-making process on disarmament, including in the Soviet-American context, which has already produced significant results in the field of disarmament.

Also attending our deliberations today are trainees in disarmament. Allow me, on behalf of the Conference and in my personal capacity, to welcome them and wish them success in their work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Italy, Belgium, Venezuela, the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Bruno Bottai.

Mr. BOTTAI (Italy): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure and satisfaction to have the opportunity to address this body under the significant and able Presidency of Romania, which is one of the most committed interpreters of difficult but sweeping positive changes in the recent past and with which Italy has excellent relations. I am confident that under your guidance the Conference will be able to face the difficult tasks ahead in the current crucial times of change.

Please allow me also to express my satisfaction for the presence today in this chamber of the parliamentary delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union who are jointly visiting Geneva. It is a further positive sign of the changing times.

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

It is a privilege and an important opportunity for reflection, to be able to share with you some considerations on the perspectives emerging in the field of disarmament at a time when Italy is engaged in a particularly challenging six-month round of the Presidency of the European Community - a very complex one, aimed at responding adequately to the extraordinary events characterizing Europe in the last few months, as well as to less positive developments such as those of these last few days.

But, let us focus for the moment on our wider expectations. From a general perspective, it will be a matter of giving shape to what is commonly called the "new architecture of Europe", to be established, as far as we are concerned, on the three fundamental pillars represented by the European Community, the Atlantic Alliance and the process of co-operation between the 35 CSCE countries. Such a new architecture is being at the same time sustained by renewed initiatives of co-operation at a subregional level.

A summit at governmental level among Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Italy has just taken place at Venice in much the same spirit, to lay the foundations of an increased co-operation between the five countries in many areas of mutual interest.

A new era of unprecedented, promising co-operation between former adversaries is thus taking shape in Europe, more in the reality of facts themselves than in the imaginative capacity of Governments, and marked by the emergence of political and economic structures unbound by dictatorship and inspired by freedom.

With regard to the European Community, two intergovernmental conferences are scheduled to take place in Rome next December with the purpose of initiating two negotiating processes with great bearing on the future economic, political and institutional framework of the Community. The first is aimed at transforming the already scheduled accomplishment of a common market by 1992 into a true economic and monetary union. The second, dealing more specifically with the political integration of The Twelve, points at reviewing decision-making, improving the functioning of institutions and providing for increased unity and cohesion of the international action of The Twelve by reforming the existing mechanisms of political co-operation. These internal EEC developments coincide with the process of change under way in many countries of central and eastern Europe, and with the adoption of new policies in internal and external relations by the Soviet Union, at a pace in keeping with the greatest turning points in history.

I shall restrict myself, Mr. President, to a few brief comments about these changes as currently seen from the Italian perspective. A broad consensus has emerged in this forum about the highly positive character of increased co-operation between the two great Powers for the maintenance of peace and stability, to the benefit of the whole world. The events of the latest hours provide a last example of this encouraging reality. The overturning of the cold-war attitude has found its most concrete and extraordinary expression in the process of unification under way in Germany and in the agreements for the settlement of the external aspects of the German issue.

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

The Italian Government is persuaded that a unified Germany, under the mark of democracy and in a spirit of full freedom of choice with respect to its future international position, will represent the most legitimate accomplishment of the expectations of its people - expectations considered unrealistic in the past - as well as a fundamental step forward in the consolidation of peace and increased stability in Europe, a continent at last freed of its greatest pending problem.

These great events have already been matched by significant developments in other fields. I would myself like to recall the Declaration adopted at the NATO Summit of 5 and 6 July, which, as I am aware, has already been introduced in this forum in its entirety. I would like to point out, in particular, the determination of its members to promote a transformation in the defensive strategy of the Alliance, in a way more in line with the new realities, including a reduced reliance of security on nuclear weapons. Italy favours changes in the NATO strategy which would further enhance the defensive orientation always attached to it and which would be based on concepts of minimal deterrence and reduced deployment of advanced military forces. Italy is also determined to strive for a broader implementation of the political dimension of NATO as well as for the adoption of a joint declaration by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, designed to register, in a solemn way, the establishment in Europe of a new political climate.

What is currently at stake in Europe reaches far beyond such considerations of a strategic nature. We believe that the coming CSCE summit in Paris and the aim of a more adequate institutionalization of its process of co-operation represents the natural outcome of recent developments, as well as a broader implementation of the objectives laid down by the Helsinki signatories.

Mr. President, we are confronted with the question of how to inject into the multilateral negotiations on disarmament the positive outcome of the favourable East-West trend, since the bilateral and multilateral components of disarmament are in fact somewhat connected to one another. Italy firmly believes that the Conference on Disarmament can contribute more effectively to the preservation of the interests individually represented by each one of us as well as of those of a wider collective nature of our common responsibility. It would seem in effect that a sort of additional responsibility is incumbent upon the 40 countries full members of the only existing negotiating forum on disarmament of a universal nature, the responsibility of being somehow depositaries of such far-reaching expectations beyond this historic chamber. For this reason also we welcome with great satisfaction the growing participation in its activities of a number of countries with the status of observers.

We are confident that the Conference on Disarmament could be entrusted with an increasing role, as an instrument both of amplification of positive developments and of wise adaptation to the specific requirements of universality. An increased negotiating effort in the field of disarmament would therefore seem necessary to us, and only the Conference on Disarmament could undertake such a task through the revision of its own growing role. Otherwise, it might run the risk of being confined to an unfruitful repetition of incompatible approaches.

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

As to the United Nations, it has given proof in the latest years of being capable of a more effective role in preserving peace in a number of regional conflicts which were heavily weighing on the world.

In a broader sense, the satisfactory or even spectacular results achieved in disarmament at bilateral or regional levels could prove to be insufficient if we were not able to match the duty of building on past experience, thereby delivering to our future generations a world less heavily armed and confrontational.

For this reason, my country considers very positively the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has undertaken a process of revision of its future role in the perspective of the conclusion of the chemical-weapons negotiations. It would seem to us difficult in this respect to refrain, sooner or later, from taking into account any suggestions about the revision of the agenda, especially when the current list will have been fully discussed. I would avail myself of this opportunity to express the wish that the process of revision under way will continue beyond the current session in accordance with the modalities which will be agreed upon as most appropriate.

The primary objective of the Conference will remain the conclusion at the earliest date of the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban. On this point there seems to be wide agreement among us, although we should be aware that by expecting to foresee in advance all the possible details and scenarios we run the risk of delaying negotiations for a number of years to come.

In Italy, we are convinced that the level of technical sophistication already achieved in the negotiations is more than sufficiently elaborated to allow for the concrete and final expression of political will, when the parties usually find the necessary boldness to come to a conclusion. However, we do not feel disheartened by the insufficiency of results so far achieved in the current advanced stage of negotiations. We have noted the Soviet-American agreements, particularly important for their commitments on the cessation of the production of chemical weapons, probably to be implemented even before the completion of the multilateral negotiations. A certain amount of exploratory activity has also been undertaken in this forum on some of the fundamental elements of the convention, and we are confident that such efforts have not been in vain. It is, however, difficult to ignore that negotiations are at a standstill on almost all the most sensitive issues at stake.

In the field of verification we register differing views on how to strike the appropriate balance between reliability of the system and concerns aimed at protecting, during its implementation, fundamental interests in terms of national security. Whenever ambitious and innovating goals are set forth, it would seem almost inevitable that each one should be ready to pay a certain price. All the more so, if we were to take into account the various experiments carried out by different countries that have produced encouraging results as to the possibility of combining the two concerns. We ourselves had reached those same conclusions in 1988, in the initial inspections carried out at some Italian chemical facilities by experts of international level.

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

Preserving the effectiveness of the future verification system of the convention is, therefore, of vital importance to all, although in doing so we should not neglect the requirements of specific regional concerns. In a negotiating process aiming at wide-ranging and global objectives, like the one we are conducting, such concerns will have to be taken into account in the appropriate way.

Achieving a universality of accessions to the convention requires therefore an effective and reliable verification system, reassuring for all, but it also needs a convention and an organizational structure likely to promote true participation by all. Participation in the future convention could not therefore merely rely on a political imperative as a result of some indirect form of international lobbying. We therefore still believe that the provisions of the convention dealing with co-operation, assistance and protection should not be neglected, since they can make visible the collective solidarity among the States parties. It would also seem appropriate in our view to set up an Executive Council whose powers and functions would ensure full effectiveness of functioning while providing for a composition sufficiently wide as to offer all States a concrete opportunity, rather than a merely theoretical one, to assume their respective responsibilities on a basis of equality.

The establishment by a number of Governments of a final time-frame or deadline for the negotiations had been envisaged by my country at various junctures, at a political level too, in order to provide for the necessary political drive towards the final stage of the negotiations. We believe, now more than ever before, in such a need. The proposals put forward in recent days about the call for a meeting of the Conference at ministerial level, to be held at the beginning of our next session and designed to provide negotiations with the necessary impetus for the final stage, would indeed meet our full expectations. We are therefore ready to examine any proposal, irrespective of its procedural implications, likely to provide us with a clear scenario for our aims.

Concluding on this point, I would like to stress that the Conference on Disarmament has an enormous achievement at hand. I do not think it would be purely rhetorical to say that a chemical-weapons ban would be an accomplishment without any comparable term of reference in the history of disarmament negotiations. It would represent the first agreement of its kind, one of universal appeal and with far-reaching provisions about international co-operation. We trust that the conclusion of the chemical-weapons ban will inject new dynamism in multilateral disarmament, one which this body will be able to profit from, taking stock of positive as well as negative experiences.

I would now briefly turn to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is a subject which Italy has always considered of great importance and which presents us with a problem of interrelationships between its bilateral aspects, as represented by the Soviet-American negotiations, and the growing expectations felt by the international community for involvement in the comprehension of the great events occurring beyond our planet. We acknowledge the reality in the negotiations between the two major "users" of outer space. They could facilitate greater stability and co-operation in the interests of all.

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

We also consider very valuable all the efforts being made by the Conference on Disarmament that are aimed at strengthening the multilateral dimension as well as the specific ideas that emerge in this context. Any intitiative or proposal aimed at the preservation of stability and the improvement of transparence must be taken into account. I have in mind the proposals about the improvement and standardization of terminology, the strengthening of the current legal régime, the extension of access to data, the improvement of the Convention on the registration of space objects and, more generally, the promotion of confidence-building measures.

During the month of March, the Parliamentary Association of the Western European Union organized in Rome a seminar dedicated to "observation satellites as a European instrument for disarmament verification". Ministers of Defence, representatives of the space industry and a number of experts took part in the initiative, which came to the conclusion that the necessary technical requirements for a viable regional system of verification of disarmament agreements are already available.

We also look with favour on the continuation of participation by national experts in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee seeking to allow greater in-depth knowledge and understanding by Governments of all the implications deriving from indiscriminate exploitation of outer space. We are willing to renew participation by Italian experts in that work.

Let me finally devote a few words to the nuclear items, a subject of considerable sensitivity for Italy's public and political opinion. It is a great pleasure for me to convey my congratulations to the Ambassador of Japan and to all the members of the Conference for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of nuclear testing. The resumption of the necessary consensus on such a complex issue, after so many years of unsuccessful attempts, certainly represents a positive development, jointly with other similar developments in the same field.

While the dismantling of the INF is continuing with a view to their subsequent total elimination, the Soviet and American agreements on their respective strategic arsenals should lead before the end of the year, to a first treaty on the reduction of the most destabilizing and offensive nuclear weapons. But what is even more important is that they have established a process aimed at additional negotiations on reductions in strategic arsenals. These achievements, combined with the prospect of the conclusion of CFE I in Vienna and with a new SNF negotiation in Europe are proof that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament has indeed been very significant as a result of the priority legitimately attached to it by a great number of countries. For this reason, too, we are hoping that the coming Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be able to register even greater support for its duration and objectives of non-proliferation.

Italy still believes that a nuclear-test ban is an important objective in disarmament which should be attained through a gradual approach allowing for decreasing testing exercises. Solving problems connected with seismic-verification techniques, with the setting up of an international

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

data-exchange network and with identification of other reliable systems of detection, requires further study. We trust that these objectives will be reached in a speedier way so as to avoid the repetition of experiences such as the one on the so-called negative security assurances. We hope that the long period of time unproductively spent in the search for a formula meant to combine the divergent strategic concepts of the nuclear-weapon States with the expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon States, not to be attacked or to be threatened by nuclear attack, will be considered in the light of recent international developments as belonging to the pre-history of disarmament.

It is necessary to make sure that the remaining time available to the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear testing will be used to prepare the ground for its rapid and uncontroversial re-establishment at the next session of the Conference, in order to allow for an expansion of debate on substantial issues on the basis of a realistic programme of work. These developments will certainly be beneficial to the Group of Scientific Experts now working again in Geneva, to whose activity our country also will provide a contribution through our national seismic-verification means.

Mr. President, the events which are now taking place in the Gulf area and which are legitimately giving rise to reactions and serious preoccupations from the international community are unfortunately there to remind us that the establishment of peace and disarmament is a process that cannot rest upon a mere contemplation of the results already achieved, no matter how positive they may be. Peace and disarmament as a consequence, and at the same time a premise, of such an objective must be consolidated and enlarged in a never-ending process, relying on efforts of good will and openness.

Negotiations on disarmament, in particular through the dimension of universality belonging to this forum, are strictly related to the international political situation, at times influencing it or being themselves its consequence.

With respect to the latest events occurring in one of the most delicate areas of the globe - but are there, after all, less delicate areas from the perspective of human suffering? - with respect to those events, we have to recognize first and foremost the importance of a co-ordinated approach by the two super-Powers, in the absence of which we would find ourselves at the edge of a precipice. But we also have to recognize that the road to the establishment of an international order free from the arrogance of force is still long. The Conference on Disarmament is clearly not the guardian of peace in the world but it represents none the less an instrument for its prior establishment and subsequent consolidation. In the search for ways and means more and more adjusted to global and regional realities, Italy believes in the need for such an effort and in the capacity of the Conference on Disarmament to be equal to such a task. We will provide our contribution in an open spirit, eager to consider any other views in order to express above all our concern for disarmament as an essential ingredient for peace.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Italy, His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Bruno Bottai, for the statement he has made and the kind

(The President)

words he had for me and for my country. I am sure that members of the Conference have listened with great interest to his statement and have carefully noted the message it contains.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Houllez.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, may I, on behalf of the Belgian delegation, convey to you our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of August. We wish you every success in the performance of your duties, particularly during this decisive period for the Conference. May I also thank your predecessors for the first months of the summer half-session, Ambassadors de Rivero and Sujka, for the dedication with which they performed their duties.

Mr. President, I would like to make a statement on behalf of the Western group concerning item 8 (Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament) under our programme of work.

The Conference in its report to the United Nations General Assembly in 1989 decided that the Ad Hoc Committee on item 8 of the agenda would resume work "with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard".

Accordingly, the Western group believes that the Conference will only need to take a decision on the possible re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the beginning of the 1991 session, in the light of the circumstances prevailing at that time and taking into account the priorities of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Houllez, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, on behalf of the delegation of Venezuela I would first like to convey to you our most cordial congratulations on seeing you presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Your recognized ability, your knowledge of disarmament matters and your enthusiasm ensure the efficacy of your guidance. The people of Venezuela maintains traditional relations of friendship and co-operation with the Romanian people, whom you represent with such distinction. We also wish to congratulate very sincerely Ambassador Sujka, of Poland, on the sound and constructive way in which he directed the Conference on Disarmament last month. We are pleased to place on record our thanks to the distinguished representative of Poland, which is a friend of Venezuela.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

Mr. President, in the course of this year in this chamber many statements and observations have been made concerning the significance of the international environment, which in general is opening auspicious prospects. A trend has been emerging towards dialogue and rapprochement, with concrete action between East and West and with expressions of constructive intentions and good will, of readiness, for example, to abandon old concepts of military doctrines that prevailed in the time of the Cold War, of moving on, at last, to new approaches towards peace and co-operation in strategic international relations. Thus, we are witnessing events which obviously awaken interest and which we are following carefully, yes, but without expecting too much.

On the other hand, we are still waiting for this fluid and dynamic international situation to have a direct impact on the work which, for several years, has been under way in this negotiating body. At the same time, we believe that the Conference cannot always remain in the wake of international dynamics or limit itself to the role of receiver of outside impacts. It is time for the Conference to stimulate and strengthen political processes by adopting agreements and measures in its important sphere of action. It is now time for all those efforts and hours of work, all those appeals to common sense to be rewarded by encouraging results in the objectives specifically pursued by this multilateral forum, results which, as we all know, continue to be elusive.

So much so, that amidst the disappointing frustrations and inevitable expectations generated by recent changes in the world scene, thoughts once again emerge, perhaps with more justification than ever, about the future and the relevance of the Conference on Disarmament. Apparently there is a consensus - that magic word - that the Conference can be equal to the demands of this moment of history and utilize the opportunity to move out of its stagnation. The problem is how to advance towards that objective without losing sight of the limitations imposed on us by reality, a reality that some delegations constantly remind us of. In formal and informal discussions, formulas and suggestions of substance and of form have been outlined to propel our work in the right direction.

We are well aware, however, that holding more or less meetings, whether in spring or in summer, will not make us able to cope properly with today's challenges unless there is the necessary political will to negotiate for concrete actions. For the same reason we do not think, for example, that a change in the Conference's agenda can of itself become significant. The items, priorities and desires, however they may be worded, are clearly defined. It is the fundamental issues concerning nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction that have to be resolved. Among them, we have an unrelinquishable desire to achieve a nuclear test ban. We must try to clear the road before us without taking on responsibilities that will make our work even more difficult and quixotic and may divert us from our central purpose.

In any case, we must persistently stress the reasons and objectives that brought this body into being. The 1990s will be crucial in many ways and will be faced with many dilemmas. Are we going to conform to a world based on nuclear deterrence, with the constant perfection of nuclear weapons?

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

Mr. President, following the traditional exercise of prolonged procedural negotiations, it proved possible to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, nuclear test ban. Of course, we are aware that it has a limited mandate, but even so we think that the Committee can serve as a catalyst for structuring a deeper and more systematic effort that will make genuine results possible.

The halting of nuclear weapon tests seeks to limit the improvement of nuclear warfare systems, thereby promoting stability and confidence in international relations. Continuation of nuclear testing would have adverse consequences at this new stage of international relations that we all hope will produce many beneficial and lasting developments.

Without such a ban the way will remain open for the emergence of new nuclear weapons, increasing the dangers inherent in vertical and horizontal proliferation. The perfection of new weapons through nuclear tests would hinder the implementation of such concepts as verification, making it more difficult and complex to adopt future disarmament agreements. Furthermore, the credibility of the legal instruments concerning non-proliferation would be even further eroded. These concerns are particularly relevant now, in view of the Fourth Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of whose main items concerns the nuclear test ban. The delegation of Venezuela wants the NPT to become a universal and effective instrument; we still believe in its possibilities and do not wish it to become increasingly compromised.

There cannot be a gradual, step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, because that would not prevent the modernization of nuclear weapons and consequently would not help to stop the qualitative improvement of testing. The aim of a complete ban of nuclear tests must be attained by an all-embracing approach, one of total prohibition. The holding of a conference to amend the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, with the aim of converting that instrument into an agreement for the complete prohibition of nuclear testing, constitutes an element supplementary to the work which the Conference on Disarmament must do to bring about negotiations in this area.

Mr. President, we cannot but express our gratification with regard to the negotiations on strategic arms that have been carried out by the United States and the Soviet Union. We appreciate the results achieved and we hope that in the light of that experience the basis may be laid for working with greater confidence in the future and achieving greater significant reductions. We say this despite the fact that in times of technological change and of doctrinal and political innovations many weapons become obsolete and more sophisticated weapons keep appearing. On that premise, the START negotiations are basically concerned with drastically reducing what the parties do not consider essential for future deterrence.

The modernization of weapons - that endless competition imposed by technology and military research laboratories - includes weapons and weapons systems to be used in outer space. We understand that on this topic the START talks have so far achieved nothing definite.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

It is obvious that there is a danger of an arms race beginning in outer space. Hence the importance of the Ad Hoc Committee on this topic, and hence the categorical attitude of the Group of 21 in favour of negotiations on specific measures. Many proposals have been made and these constitute a good working basis.

In our view, the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee in the past five years shows the urgent need for holding negotiations on concrete measures, there being a set of proposals which have to be studied carefully to identify areas of convergence and arrive at agreements on the subject.

Accordingly, the Group of 21 has suggested ways of improving the work of the Committee in examining these proposals, by the creation of sub-groups or contact groups. Our delegation hopes that next year the Committee's work will change course and concentrate on the consideration of those proposals.

Mr. President, one of the main responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament is the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee dealing with this item has expended considerable effort on the achievement of that objective, an objective that we hope will be or can be reached above all else as rapidly as possible.

An element that must characterize this instrument is universality. To achieve this, the Convention must fix as its scope total and complete prohibition. It must not entitle States which have chemical weapons to establish certain arsenals or to delay the destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities.

In this connection and with regard to the bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning chemical weapons, we welcome their decision to halt the production of these weapons and to begin their destruction. Nevertheless, as regards the multilateral process of destruction to which all the States parties to the convention would be committed, we cannot accept any premise that provides for the maintenance of certain arsenals till the end of the process of destruction.

Another important aspect in negotiating the convention is the system of verification. This machinery will have to include a procedure that would operate spontaneously for verifying compliance with the obligations established by the convention, and a verification procedure that would operate upon request for determining the truth of any accusation alleging violation of the convention. Furthermore, the verification machinery must be as non-intrusive as possible.

Consequently, we recognize the need for this instrument to include effective provisions for ensuring compliance. The system to be established should be as efficient, simple and, as we have stressed on other occasions, as least costly as possible.

Before concluding this statement, I would like to reiterate our announcement at the beginning of the session that the Government of Venezuela intends to organize a regional seminar, for Latin America and the Caribbean,

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

on chemical weapons. For reasons of force majeure this seminar has been postponed to the first half of next year. Consultations are now being carried out with the Secretariat of the United Nations on finalization of the details.

The seminar will seek to familiarize all the States of the region with the scope, purposes and objectives of the convention as well as with the verification machinery that will have to be established.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga, for the statement he has made and the kind and encouraging words he had for me personally and for my country and people.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, allow me to take advantage of my first intervention before the Conference on Disarmament, to thank all of you, the Presidents for June and July, and members and observers, for accepting me in your midst with many warm words of welcome and for having made my start - through your help - an easy one. At the same time, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the assumption of your important post as President for the month of August.

Mr. President, this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to a close. It is time to take stock and render account of what we have achieved in the course of this session, in particular with regard to our most urgent task, the elaboration of a universal convention providing for a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons. Reviewing the state of our negotiations on chemical weapons, we are at a historical juncture, particularly promising and favourable for disarmament. This is a time to seize existing opportunities, which in our case means to translate the consensus of the international community - as it manifested itself at the Paris Conference - into a comprehensive and global convention effectively banning chemical weapons.

However, I cannot help but feel disappointed. Despite the untiring efforts and the excellent work of this year's Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius, we have failed to resolve some as yet outstanding key issues in our negotiations. Progress has been slow. The pace of our negotiations seems to have slackened compared to last year. Indeed, during the past few weeks, I not only had the impression that we were dragging our feet but that we were also faced with a possible retrogression in our negotiations. This picture is all the more disconcerting as the necessary political and material prerequisites for the timely and successful conclusion of our chemical weapons negotiations exist. History does not repeat its offers.

The state of our work on verification issues and, in particular, the discussions during the summer part of the session on ad hoc verification and challenge inspections have given cause for concern. Challenge inspections are considered to be an indispensable element and a corner-stone of the verification system. It is, as the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. Waldegrave, recently put it,

(Mr. von Wagner, Federal Republic of Germany)

"the key to effective verification". My delegation therefore has always attached great importance to this issue in our negotiations. We have consistently advocated a rapid solution to this problem. This would not only remove one of the obstacles in the way of completing the verification system, but would also provide a strong stimulus for tackling the other yet unresolved issues of the convention. In spring, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, in a bold and commendable effort to bring the discussions on the issue to a successful conclusion - discussions which have been intensively pursued now for more than three years - put forward a new draft of article IX. This proposal by Ambassador Hyltenius underwent two revisions, which resulted in a considerable improvement of the text. Recently, however, new amendments to the text have been presented which could be understood to amount to changing the basic characteristics of the challenge inspection régime. These very characteristics have been discussed over a number of years now and clearly a consensus had seemed to emerge on them. Therefore, it will be our task to ensure that ways are found to come back to this road and find solutions which make it possible for everyone to share this consensus.

I should not dwell at length on the issue of challenge inspections, since our views are well known and my predecessor, Ambassador von Stülpnagel, on 8 March of this year already made a plenary statement devoted in its entirety to this subject. However, in view of recent developments, let me make a few specific additional observations.

Owing to the limited coverage of routine verification and the risks of circumvention, we need an additional verification measure, with the help of which all States parties are able to clarify doubts about the compliance of others. If we were to restrict challenge inspections to what might be called "relevant" facilities, we not only create a definitional problem but also imply an overall reduction in the coverage of challenge inspections that reduces the stringency and effectiveness so far sought by these inspections. We are convinced that because of the peculiar verification problems posed by chemical weapons, each State party should have the right to request a challenge inspection. Only in this way can all States parties be given the necessary assurance of compliance and the verifiability of the convention be assured.

There should be no sites exempted from the challenge inspection régime, if the verification system of a chemical weapons convention is to work. As the experience with our national trial challenge inspections has shown, it is possible to grant access even to very sensitive facilities. We found that "managed access" procedures can sufficiently ensure that sensitive installations and information are protected. Following our experience we would suggest that the concept of "managed access", which has already to some extent been elaborated in the protocol on inspection procedures, be made a focal point of our discussions. In its Working Paper (CD/1012) of 11 July 1990 the United Kingdom presented an analysis of the results of the trial challenge inspections they had nationally conducted at military facilities. We have particularly welcomed this paper because it represents an important input into our negotiations. It should, in particular, stimulate further thinking on the issue of "managed access".

(Mr. von Wagner, Federal Republic of Germany)

Furthermore, I wish to point out that it is on the basis of experience gained from our national trial inspections that we fully support the conclusions drawn in the Working Paper of the United Kingdom.

In this context I would like to introduce Working Paper CD/1026 (CD/CW/WP.315), which is in front of you, on various verification instruments demonstrated during the Workshop in Münster in mid-June, to which all member and observer States of the Conference on Disarmament had been invited.

Some of the instruments and methods described in our Working Paper are already available to inspection teams confronted with the task of verifying compliance effectively in the least intrusive manner. They have proved, under increasingly realistic circumstances, to be extremely useful in the conduct of different types of inspections, whether ad hoc or challenge. Others are being developed under our national research and development programme on verification instrumentation.

Another issue in the field of verification is ad hoc verification. We consider this to be an important element, complementing and strengthening the verification of non-production in article VI. As early as January 1988, we submitted a proposal on ad hoc checks in order to make a constructive contribution to resolving a problem that was raised by a number of delegations: the potential of existing facilities in the chemical industry, in particular those which are not declared under any of the annexes to article VI, to produce chemical weapons. We conceive of ad hoc verification measures to be a non-intrusive instrument of a routine character, its main purpose being to verify the absence of substances listed in the "Annex on chemicals". Such non-intrusive checks would cover those parts of industry which might possibly be misused for the production of chemical weapons. As with other routine verification measures, the selection of facilities to be inspected by ad hoc verification measures would be made on the basis of the declarations to be submitted by all States parties. These declarations would be made in the form of national registers which, in accordance with an agreed format, would list all relevant plant sites of the chemical industry.

We have made a specific and concrete proposal on the establishment of national registers in document CD/984 of 10 April 1990. The reactions we have so far received on our proposal are encouraging and we are convinced that with the broad approach we have adopted - the ability to produce chemical weapons is hard to define unambiguously - we have pointed the way to a manageable and easily implementable solution. We stand ready to continue in-depth discussion on this proposal.

Following the preparatory work that has been undertaken over the last two years, we are somewhat disappointed that it was not possible to make any progress on ad hoc verification this year. The discussion paper (CD/CW/WP.286) of 11 April 1990, which Australia put forward on behalf of the Western Group, provided a good outline of an overall approach to ad hoc verification. This paper was followed by a Working Paper of the United States (CD/CW/WP.300 of 27 June 1990), which proposed draft treaty language. For my Government it is disappointing that the opportunities provided by these papers have not been seized. We would have preferred a drafting exercise that would have helped to clarify the various positions. I know that there are some delegations that in

(Mr. von Wagner, Federal Republic of Germany)

the course of this summer have expressed general reservations as to the need of ad hoc verification measures. We respect that. However, we just cannot ignore a concern that has been expressed by many delegations, namely with regard to the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in existing facilities of the chemical industry. Ad hoc verification measures are to address this concern. And it would only be prudent before any final decision is taken to sufficiently explore this issue. Thus, we hope that the forthcoming inter-sessionals will be used to this end and that a result-oriented approach will be adopted.

Mr. President, it is due to recent developments in our negotiations that I have devoted my statement today to verification issues. This should in no way mean that there are no other issues which require determined actions on our part. Indeed, we are somewhat concerned that such important aspects as article X (assistance), article XI (economic and technological development) have also not been resolved. My delegation recognizes the interest that many delegations place in these two articles and the hope that that interest should sufficiently be taken into account. A solution to these issues is now long overdue. We are convinced that a solution acceptable to all is feasible and we are prepared to work constructively for an early and successful conclusion of our negotiations on those two items.

Without going into detail, and despite the shortcomings mentioned above, I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude for the progress achieved on a wide variety of subjects. We are indebted to Mr. Meerburg for carrying forward the work on many technical issues and, in particular, the solution of the long-standing question of order of destruction. I was also particularly impressed by the imaginative approach that Dr. Krutzsch took on such difficult issues as amendments, settlement of disputes and measures to redress a situation. His efforts were crowned by success and even though it was not possible to arrive at a solution to the latter issue, acceptable for inclusion in appendix I, a solid basis has been laid for further work on it.

Mr. President, this analysis of the current situation in our negotiations shows us that much work remains to be done. We have to face the situation as it is and we have to try to overcome existing difficulties. The international situation and the great progress made in other areas of arms control should stimulate us to work hard and try to resolve the remaining key issues of our negotiations with the necessary urgency and in a constructive spirit. We can thereby prove our seriousness about concluding a multilateral convention and should have a good chance for success in our endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner, for the statement he has made and the kind words he addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Minister-Counsellor Towpik.

Mr. TOWPIK (Poland): Mr. President, please accept my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. For my delegation it is a great pleasure to see the representative of traditionally friendly Romania presiding over this body. I wish you all success during this month of August, which is a rather difficult period in our work. I also pledge the full co-operation of my delegation in the fulfilment of your duties.

Mr. President, yesterday marked the forty-fifth anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima. Along with all humanity, we pay tribute to the victims who perished in that nuclear explosion. Hiroshima, however, is not only the tragedy of a nation and people; it is also a dramatic proof that at the present stage of the development of the means of warfare, disarmament - and, in particular, nuclear disarmament - has ceased to be a theoretical postulate or an idealistic dream. It has become a necessary element in any search, not only for peace and international security, but also for the very survival of civilization.

We are going through a period of radical change in international relations. This is not merely an improvement in the political climate such as we have witnessed in earlier decades. Rather, this change introduces deep modifications in the very structure of post-war international relations. It alters the whole strategic context in which our debates are taking place and we must ponder seriously on the implications of this change with regard to disarmament negotiations.

Allow me, Mr. President, to dwell for a while on this issue. Despite the expectations held at the end of the Second World War, military alliances substituted for the concept of collective security foreseen in the United Nations Charter. International security was perceived first of all as the issue of the relationship and strategic balance between East and West. Even the policy of non-alignment, as a common element of the security policy of many countries of the Third World, followed from that strategic reality and, in fact, was an expression of adjustment to that reality.

Today, the bloc concept of security is undergoing tremendous change. The division of the world into military alliances, as the main feature of international relations and as the basic element of the security policy of their main actors, is becoming more and more the symbol of the past rather than the reality of the present.

The world's most mighty nations have turned away from their concentration on military strength towards regular and productive dialogue. Their disarmament negotiations have brought unprecedented agreements. New important treaties are in prospect. Military alliances remain, but both their character and their mutual relationship are being deeply transformed - changes which today's important statement by H.E. Ambassador Bruno Bottai stressed with great force. In fact, Cold-War adversaries are seeing more and more fields for co-operation. Their defence planning and military strategy are being adapted to new conditions. Blocs are being considered more as forums of political consultations than as military alliances.

(Mr. Towpik, Poland)

All of this is also being reflected in this forum. The division of Conference members into political and regional groupings is losing its previous significance, for it does not symbolize necessarily conflicting views but, rather, different circles of consultations. In fact, existing divisions must not reflect real differences in approaches to disarmament and international security. Nor is there any justification for attempts to replace the East-West division with the North-South dichotomy. In the field of international security, that is artificial and dangerous. There are, of course, differences in approaches to disarmament and there are different areas of special interests. These differences, however, are not necessarily related to membership or non-membership of military alliances. The Conference has ceased to be a tripartite body. Multilateralism in our negotiations is acquiring a new meaning.

Mr. President, new conditions also demand new thinking about national and international security. It is probably true that in the years to come "mutual deterrence" or "minimal deterrence" will still be considered as an indispensable part of international stability. If we want, however, to look into the future, we must think beyond "deterrence" and conceive another basis of international security.

Under the circumstances which are now emerging, the concept of collective security embodied in the United Nations Charter is becoming more important than ever before in the post-war period. If our intention is to create new guarantees of global security shared by all nations, the present historic transition in international relations must be a transition from bloc security to the effective United Nations system of collective security.

Practical implementation of this system and its efficient functioning could be of extreme value for disarmament efforts. It would help negotiate disarmament treaties; it would contribute to compliance with such treaties; it would create important guarantees of security for States in case of violation of disarmament obligations.

A common attachment to the vision of the United Nations collective security system, reflecting new political and military realities and taking into account the interests of all States, could also give us an important new orientation in our work and help to define new areas of possible agreement.

Mr. President, in the context of these considerations, let me discuss some aspects of item 5 of our agenda.

Our aim is to prevent an arms race from spreading to outer space. Despite positive changes in international relations and intensive discussion at this Conference, we are still far from any agreement. Nevertheless, some possibilities of progress are now seen particularly in two fields:

(a) in the field of confidence-building measures related mainly to greater openness and transparency in outer-space activities; and

(b) in the field of expansion of practical principles for outer-space activities by the establishment of a code of conduct or "rules of the road".

(Mr. Towpik, Poland)

As far as the first domain is concerned, it should be remembered that the concept of transparency and openness has become one of the widely accepted approaches in present arms control and disarmament negotiations. It has been firmly introduced into these negotiations as a means of promoting confidence and mutual understanding.

Let me remind you of the sets of measures already agreed within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, negotiations relating to the "open skies" proposal as well as predictability or confidence-building measures discussed in the bilateral American-Soviet outer-space talks. There is also a considerable number of proposals relating to greater openness in outer-space activities which have been submitted to this Conference. They include those which were presented by Poland last August in the Working Paper entitled "Confidence-Building Measures related to Item 5" (CD/941 and CD/OS/WP.38), and which indicate one of the possible approaches to this problem.

Proposals submitted so far suggest not only various degrees of transparency but also different modes of its implementation: on a voluntary or obligatory basis; by amending the 1975 Convention on Registration of Outer Space Objects or by a separate agreement; creating new appropriate bodies, or for example, using the services of the Secretary-General of this Conference.

In the period of radically changing attitudes towards military secrets and in the period of wide acceptance of the importance of transparency in military activities, it would be difficult to find any reason why openness and transparency should not cover outer-space activities as well.

What is more, taking into account the increasing volume of information relating to outer space offered by the United States and the Soviet Union to this Conference, as well as their bilateral discussions on some confidence-building measures, any new multilateral solution in this field would be only a further logical step that responds to the legitimate interests of the world community.

The second category of agreements which seem to meet special interests are arrangements concerning the "rules of the road". The intention here is to avoid accidental destruction or damage of satellites and to remove suspicions as to the intentions of States. Various ideas regarding the specific content of appropriate agreements have been presented and they deserve serious consideration. Such consideration should take into account not only security aspects but also the very fact that outer space is really becoming quite crowded. This year discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has introduced a considerable amount of expert knowledge relating to this issue.

There is, however, still another category of measures where possibilities of agreement should be especially actively sought and where progress might have particular value. It is in the field of co-operative measures in the use of outer space, not only for civil but also for certain military purposes. In fact, outer-space activities seem to entail not only a serious risk of a new arms race but also an enormous potential for constructive co-operation.

(Mr. Towpik, Poland)

The use of peaceful space technology has brought about many benefits for mankind and helped to meet important civilian needs, such as in telecommunications, weather forecasting, and earth-resources surveys. More co-operation in this field could offer the advantages of space systems to an increasing number of countries.

What is more important, however, is that substantial possibilities of co-operation also exist in the military field. Satellite remote-sensing technology has created the ability to observe various processes on Earth which are important from the point of view of international security. This technology can and should be put at the service of the United Nations security system. Indeed, the idea of international monitoring agencies or of independent satellite observation systems has been advanced by a number of Governments and in various forms. These include proposals inter alia by France, Canada, the USSR and Sweden. The sphere of competence of such a system could cover the monitoring of arms control arrangements, collecting information and data on sensitive areas as well as supporting United Nations peace-keeping efforts.

It would be of the utmost importance if the two most advanced outer-space Powers, in co-operation with others which expressed their interest, could inform this Conference or the United Nations that they offer the use of their outer-space systems, or some part of them, to the United Nations system of collective security. It would be another leap forward not only in the use of outer space but also in the thinking of mankind about international security.

It could become a key in a new approach to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Such an arms race can be prevented not only by bans and prohibitions but also by international co-operation, taking into account the security interests of all States.

At the same time, such observation and monitoring arrangements, internationally created and managed, could complement and strengthen the structure of the United Nations collective security system, making its activity more efficient and the international environment more secure.

Mr. President, the main purpose of this statement was to emphasize the need for new thinking in disarmament and security issues. Without new bold ideas and fresh approaches, it would be difficult to solve many of the existing problems in our negotiations. There is a danger that orthodox views on security and traditional approaches to disarmament may impede our work and limit its results despite much more promising conditions at present.

The Cold War impoverished our thinking on international security. It did not allow the implementation in practice of the collective security mechanism provided for in the United Nations Charter. It hampered serious discussion on ambitious plans for the internationalization of atomic energy and ensuring that it would be used for peaceful purposes only (the so-called Baruch Plan). It brought instead the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Towpik, Poland)

Today when the Cold War seems to be over, it is time to consider all possible options for creating conditions of security. This applies in particular to outer space, which is a relatively new domain of human activity. If we do not find new approaches to this activity, then there is no reason to believe that outer space will be exempt from military competition, with all the possible consequences which we know from recent history.

International co-operation in outer space in the service of the United Nations machinery could not only prevent an arms race there but also become an important contribution to the building of an effective United Nations security system. It might consolidate the authority of the United Nations, which we need more and more.

To conclude, Mr. President, this Conference should not only be a negotiating table for disarmament measures but also a forum of reflection on the organization of international security, of which these measures will be a part.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Poland, Minister-Counsellor Towpik, for the statement he has made and for the kind words he addressed to the President, as well as for his remarks on the friendly and traditional relations between the Polish and Romanian peoples.

Allow me to add to today's list of speakers the distinguished representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Králik.

Mr. KRALIK (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic): Mr. President, thank you for giving me the floor. As the Co-ordinator of the Group of East European and Other States, I would like to state the following.

The Group of East European and Other States attaches importance to the question of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Group considers this Programme as an appropriate approach to general disarmament matters.

The Group believes that the Conference on Disarmament should make an important contribution to the success of the Third Disarmament Decade.

Noting document CD/956 of 4 September 1989, which states that "... The Ad Hoc Committee also agreed that it shall resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard", the Group expresses its view that the Conference should do some additional work and conduct a productive discussion about the concrete future activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament before its re-establishment.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me on this occasion to welcome you to your new post of responsibility as President of the Conference on Disarmament. Sir, last week my delegation had occasion to present the position of the Group of 21 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Today we listened with great attention and respect to expressions of their positions both by countries of the western group and

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

by countries of eastern Europe, and I have asked for the floor again in this forum to reiterate the position of the Group of 21 on this matter. It is that, in view of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/119, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be re-established when the work of the Conference on Disarmament resumes at its 1991 session. To fail to do this or unnecessarily to delay a decision thereon would be rather surprising. The reasons are various. First, the text of resolution 44/119 A is clear. Secondly, resolution 44/119 A was adopted with no votes against and only one abstention. At this Conference, an arena of international thinking - since the adoption of that resolution and up to today - no delegation that has taken the floor has failed to recognize that there have been positive changes in the international situation and that it is favourable for undertakings in the field of disarmament to accelerate negotiations and to promote confidence. Why then postpone implementation of the provisions of resolution 44/119 A?

In short, Mr. President, I have taken the floor just to repeat once again the position of the Group of 21 on this point.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba, Mrs. Bauta Solés, for the statement she has made and for her kind words addressed to the President.

I also see the hand of the distinguished representative of China. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. HOU Zhitong (China) (translated from Chinese): Thank you, Mr. President. Since this is the first time the Chinese delegation has taken the floor in August, allow me first of all to congratulate you, a distinguished member of the Romanian delegation, on your assumption of the Presidency for the month of August.

This month is a final and most critical one for the Conference on Disarmament. Our work this year has been intense and arduous. The Chinese delegation is convinced that your experience and ability will surely steer the work of Conference for this month smoothly to its conclusion. Our delegation will co-operate constructively with you in the exercise of your duties. The Chinese delegation is very pleased to welcome the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Ambassador Bruno Bottai, as well as the Soviet and United States legislators who are attending our meeting today. The Chinese delegation would like to express its appreciation for the interest shown in the work of the Conference.

Mr. President, we have just listened to statements by various Groups on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament (CPD). The Chinese delegation too would like to make some brief remarks on this matter. As I pointed out in my statement of 31 July, the Chinese delegation, like the Group of 21, is of the view that next year the Conference should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and allow it to go to work. First, the formulation of the CPD is the common desire of the international community. Since 1978, the United Nations General Assembly, the Special Session on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament have all adopted relevant resolutions and documents affirming the need for formulating

(Mr. Hou Zhitong, China)

this programme and calling for its earliest preparation. The Conference has been engaged in that task for more than 10 years and has made much progress. Moreover, numerous proposals and views have been put forward by various delegations and countries. Here it should be mentioned in particular that the distinguished former Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, made an important contribution in this regard, as has the Group of 21. All this has provided a sound basis for further work on this matter. We should continue our efforts and not quit half way.

Secondly, the CPD is an important and potent element of the international effort in disarmament. It will point to correct approaches and objectives for the progress of disarmament, and elaborate the important principles governing international negotiations for such progress. It will be of great importance for halting the arms race and promoting disarmament and be a safeguard to all of peace and security. The '90s will mark the third United Nations Disarmament Decade. The elaboration of the CPD will contribute significantly to the success of the Decade, and bring into full play the role of the United Nations as well as that of the Conference on Disarmament in the progress of disarmament.

Thirdly, in 1989 all members of the Conference unanimously adopted a report to the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly stating as follows: "... agreed that it shall resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard". Last year, at its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted, by 154 votes in favour, none against and one abstention, resolution 44/119 A, whereby the General Assembly "calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to consider, at the beginning of its 1991 session, the resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament with the aim of resolving the outstanding issues in order to conclude the elaboration of the programme". The Chinese delegation is of the view that the present circumstances are very favourable for the resumption of this task. The Conference should not miss this opportunity and it should implement the relevant resolution of the General Assembly. Mr. President, the Chinese delegation has all along held a positive attitude towards the elaboration of the CPD. We are willing to enter into further co-operation with various parties so that this task will eventually be accomplished.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, for his statement and his kind words regarding the President and the delegation of Romania.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? It does not seem so.

Allow me now to make some announcements concerning our work, in particular concerning the preparation and adoption of the reports of subsidiary bodies and the final report of the Conference - information which I ask delegations to carefully note.

(The President)

The informal consultations open to all delegations on the substantive paragraphs concerning item 2 will begin today, immediately after adjournment of the plenary meeting, in this room. I would remind you that Working Paper CD/WP.391 was distributed to delegations on 31 July last. These consultations will continue if necessary on Thursday, 9 August.

I would also inform the Conference that, today, the secretariat distributed, under symbol CD/WP.393 the English text of the substantive paragraphs on item 3. The Conference will hold informal consultations open to all delegations on agenda item 3 as from Thursday, 9 August.

I should further remind you that the Conference will hold an informal meeting on Thursday, 9 August, immediately after the plenary meeting, to begin the first reading of the technical part of the report to the General Assembly. The English text of the relevant document, CD/WP.388, was distributed in delegations' pigeon-holes yesterday. The text in the other official languages will be available today.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso, will present the Committee's report on Thursday, 9 August, and the text will be available in all official languages on that day. I intend to submit it to the Conference for decision at our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 14 August.

I have no other matters on today's agenda and I intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 9 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.572
9 August 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

GE.90-62528/2322B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 572nd Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference is today continuing its consideration of agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, pursuant to rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member who wishes to speak on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representative of Hungary in his capacity as chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the representative of Switzerland, and the representative of Italy in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, His Excellency Ambassador Varga, who, as its Chairman, will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons contained in document CD/1027.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): Mr. President, I have the honour to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on its work during the 1990 session.

Before presenting the report of the Committee, I would like to use this opportunity to welcome you and express my best wishes on your accession to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has been made available to delegations under the symbol CD/1027.

By way of introduction to the report, I would like to point out that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons continued the pattern of work established over the preceding years, that is, the bulk of the substantive work was carried out in two contact groups, respectively track A and B.

The Ad Hoc Committee's work objective for 1990 was to further develop the texts on the main elements for a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

To reach this goal, the two contact groups used as a basis for work their respective texts contained in last year's report of the Ad Hoc Committee. They reviewed the texts with an eye for further enriching, developing or simplifying them as appropriate. The main objective was to find solutions to key issues, that is, to seek single formulations for the main elements of the future instruments, where alternative formulations had prevailed. It was also considered important to give attention to questions of verification.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

In assessing the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee for 1990, I should like to point to some movement in certain areas. Contact Group A has succeeded in eliminating most of the previous footnotes as well as in merging the previous alternative language into common language for "scope", "peaceful uses", "verification" and "other main elements". A preamble has also been worked out. Efforts were made to overcome the remaining political differences on key issues. However, the remaining footnotes and brackets in the record indicate that a number of important issues are still waiting for solution. It should be stressed, however, that a clearer picture of the main elements of a future radiological weapons convention has emerged opening up the possibility of advancing the negotiations.

There are less results to report on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Efforts were made to find solutions for the basic differences of view in the area of "scope", in particular, but alternative approaches to the convention have been maintained. Lack of agreement on the scope of the convention has consequently affected consideration of the other possible elements.

I would like to use this opportunity to express my thanks to Mr. Helmut Herzbruch, of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mr. Hassan G. Mashhadi, of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who served as co-ordinators of contact groups A and B respectively. Their invaluable assistance and innovative efforts contributed in a decisive manner to the smooth running of the substantive work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

I should also like to express my thanks to the Secretariat for all the assistance rendered throughout the year. In particular, I thank Mr. Cassandra and Ms. Cummins for their help with the Ad Hoc Committee's work.

May I close my statement in my capacity as a national representative. I would like to express my thanks to all the distinguished colleagues who in their statements have said words of farewell to me. As I am leaving the Conference on Disarmament soon, I would like to reciprocate their kind words and wish to colleagues whom I am leaving behind all the best and much success in their future work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Varga for introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I would also like to congratulate him on the conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 7. Since this is the last time that Ambassador Varga has taken the floor in the plenary of the Conference, I would like to wish him on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf all the very best for success in his future activities and private life.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI TCHEUL (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Mr. President, first I should like to congratulate you on the very competent manner in which you have been guiding this month's work of the Conference, which is taking place in an atmosphere of special expectation and interest.

Even in an international political situation tending towards détente and disarmament, there are serious problems in certain sectors and there has been no change in a number of disputed regional issues.

It is the threat of nuclear weapons that is the biggest threat to world peace and security and the existence of mankind.

The nuclear horrors ushered in 45 years ago still make mankind shudder today, and the enormous power of nuclear destruction accumulated by the fierce nuclear arms race keeps human beings in a permanent state of anxiety and fear. Today is precisely the forty-fifth anniversary of that unforgettable day when an atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki mercilessly killing many Japanese and Koreans.

It is the common desire of all, regardless of differences of ideologies and régimes, to live in peace in a stable world, free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, effective measures to settle without delay the problems that haunt us all should be taken immediately with a view to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

First, the nuclear weapon States should reduce the nuclear-weapon stocks in their own countries and at the same time completely withdraw all such weapons deployed in other countries, particularly in non-nuclear States and regions.

This question is very timely today when it is said that the nuclear Powers are becoming reconciled and have entered a phase of nuclear disarmament and that the Cold War has come to an end.

The dismantling of nuclear weapons in other countries constitutes the best guarantee for peace and security on our planet, and nuclear disarmament will certainly offer an occasion for accelerating general disarmament and will be an important event world-wide.

Secondly, there must be a ban on nuclear tests for the perfection of nuclear weapons, which could reverse the nuclear disarmament process and sow distrust for nuclear disarmament practices; States which have such weapons should promise to implement the ban. If that promise precedes the adoption of the nuclear test-ban treaty as a whole, that will be an expression of political goodwill which will offer good prospects for the preparation of the treaty. With that in mind, it is encouraging to see the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test-ban treaty, which ceased to function seven years ago resuming its work in the month of July, and we hope that it will make progress speedily in the activities and make up for the time that has been lost.

(Mr. Ri Tcheul, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Thirdly, the nuclear weapon States should furnish more specific guarantees not to use nuclear weapons against States which do not have such weapons.

Aware of the anxiety of the latter requesting guarantees of non-use, the former make a general promise. Consequently, there is no reason not to accept the request for a bilateral and regional guarantee of non-use made by certain non-nuclear-weapon States which are exposed to a real nuclear threat in a particular situation.

The proposal to create nuclear-free peace zones made mainly by non-nuclear-weapon States in various parts of the world is no less important than the reduction of nuclear weapons among the nuclear-weapon States.

Such efforts should be given due attention by the Conference on Disarmament and should always be encouraged.

The Fourth Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will be opening soon, will provide an important opportunity to strengthen that treaty and respond to requests for nuclear disarmament made in a changed climate.

Mr. President, along with demand for improving the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, demand is increasing for discussion of regional problems. This results from a reality which calls for urgent solution of regional problems both for the achievement of general and complete disarmament and for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The situation in the Korean peninsula, however, has not seen any radical change even today, when divided countries are being reunited and prolonged disputes in varius regions are now being settled through negotiations and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

It is well known that the situation in the Korean peninsula remains one of the world's tensest confrontations and that it is threatening international peace and security, to say nothing of the peace and security of the Asia and Pacific region. Koreans are living in this state of anxiety, whether in the North or the South or abroad, and all want peace in Korea and national reunification, which will put an end to this tension and to all kinds of misfortunes.

To overcome these obstacles the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward a five-point unification proposal last April consisting essentially of détente, freedom to travel, a general opening and negotiations, and, on 31 May last, made a new disarmament proposal. This new proposal has been circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1007) and can be summarized as follows:

First, confidence-building measures between North and South: Limitation of military exercises; conversion of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the military demarcation line (MDL) into a zone of peace; measures to prevent accidental conflict.

(Mr. Ri Tcheul, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Secondly, measures to reduce North-South armed forces: Reduction of respective armed forces to less than 100,000 men in three phases over three to four years; cessation of qualitative improvement of military equipment; informing one another of reductions of armed forces and their verification.

Thirdly, measures for withdrawal of foreign armed forces: Conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone; complete, phased withdrawal of foreign troops.

Fourthly, measures to guarantee peace after disarmament: Deployment of a neutral nations' inspection force in the demilitarized zone along the MDL; formation of a North-South joint military committee; adoption of a North-South declaration of non-aggression.

Our new disarmament proposal, which is based on the earlier proposals, has some special features.

First, it provides realistic means for effectively ensuring peace in the peninsula and settling the problem of peace in a short time. Secondly, it contains much of what has been proposed by the United States and the South Korean authorities, including confidence building. Thirdly, it first seeks to settle the problems between North and South that can be resolved under present conditions, when negotiations have not yet been held between ourselves and the United States, the latter being involved in Korean affairs. We hope to sit down at the same table with the United States to discuss disarmament in Korea. Fourthly, it opens the way to a definitive solution of the Korean question, while also providing for the phased withdrawal of foreign troops.

This proposal will open a breach for the cause of reunification of the Korean peninsula and will give great impetus to attenuation of the situation in Asia and the Pacific.

It is encouraging that the United States and the South Korean authorities have shown a positive attitude to our proposal, thereby making it possible to discuss disarmament in high-level talks between delegations of North and South Korea led by the Prime Ministers. It is the first time in North-South relations that military representatives will be present at high-level North-South negotiations and that the question of disarmament will be a priority item on the agenda. If these negotiations are successful, a brake will be applied to the increase in armaments in the Korean peninsula, confidence will be strengthened and tension will rapidly be reduced. Both during the Cold War and at present, when the main trend is characterized by dialogue and détente, my Government has practised its invariable policy of pursuing by way of negotiations a peaceful solution to the Korean question and has made all sincere efforts for its implementation.

Mr. President, at the current summer session, during which discussions have been held in keeping with the development of the situation, differences of opinion have greatly diminished and a certain amount of progress has been made. Nevertheless, the Conference on Disarmament is faced with some new problems, including regional problems which require increasingly urgent solutions along with the more thorough discussion of regular agenda items. My delegation as a non-member State assures you that in future it will participate actively in the work of the Conference and it will do everything in its power to contribute to its success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul, for his statement and for his kind words regarding the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Switzerland, Mr. Ochsner.

Mr. OCHSNER (Switzerland): Mr. President, first of all please accept our delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the presidency during the month of August.

We can hardly ignore major events outside of the conference room and continue as if nothing has happened. While we were quietly doing our paperwork, the situation in the Middle East has seriously deteriorated in a way that discussions on the details of a chemical weapons convention could become partially obsolete for the time being. Once the situation is redressed however - a difficult and dangerous process to be carried out by people other than by disarmament and arms control specialists of diplomacy - it could be indicated to continue the negotiations, and we will need an inventory of what has been accomplished hitherto. Some political obstacles may hopefully have been removed by then. That is why from our point of view the Conference has to finish its work of the 1990 session in the field of chemical weapons according to pre-planned dispositions whatever happens.

Mr. President, being close to the end of my assignment as an observer to the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to give you some personal opinions and confine my intervention just to two points - in the field of the chemical weapons sector and the role of non-Members - points of practical significance, and I would be very much obliged to you if you would be kind enough to allow me the floor for a couple of minutes.

Beforehand, however, I set great importance on expressing my delegation's gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 4, Ambassador Hyltenius, for having conducted this session's work with much competence and perseverance and, in addition, for having continued the tradition created by his predecessor, Ambassador Morel, of holding contact meetings with the non-Member States - which, indeed, must appear most indicated in view of their increased number and the declared goal of universality of the chemical weapons convention. Furthermore, we think that the most useful role played by the Swedish delegation, above all in the CW negotiations, deserves full recognition and shows clearly that the size of the population of a country does not necessarily reflect its possibilities or its limitations of making a precious contribution in a particular matter of worldwide interest. I can only regret that it was not practical for us to give more support to the Committee's endeavours. For small delegations with a rather modest back-up it is, as a matter of fact, quite a demanding task to serve this Conference effectively, particularly in technical matters, and not to content themselves with mere talking. That is why, admittedly a little bit late, we are striving to make a build-up, and that is, on the other hand, also the reason why our delegation has, up to this day, rarely asked for the floor in order to avoid needless delay.

(Mr. Ochsner, Switzerland)

Now to the points I would like to bring forward in all due brevity. First, a word on the state of our work in the light of the political goal No. 1 of a possible CW convention, namely universality. As every newcomer realizes nearly right from the beginning, multilateral negotiations on an extremely complex and complicated matter require from everybody, particularly from the working group leaders, and the chairman, a patience going far beyond imagination. To bring about a consensus of 40 States parties appears sometimes nearly impossible particularly if no deviation from the ordinary diplomatic rites, as for instance advance inquiries, is permitted.

The situation becomes even more delicate if universality of the convention is envisaged, because this would actually require the approval of States non-members of the Conference, since complete adherence is one of the main concerns.

Nevertheless, a certain number of topics could be brought ashore this year, and numerous subjects are in a high degree of maturity. But on the whole, despite intensive efforts, relatively little has been achieved. Ambassador Morel in his last week's brilliant analysis of the future path to take has rightly pointed out, in our view, that general hesitation has got hold of the Committee. Indeed, an atmosphere of confidence has not been established to a sufficient degree and the feeling that we are sitting in the same boat has up to now not seemed to prevail everywhere. A considerable amount of optimism is required to sustain the belief that the convention in its present contours could be finished by end of next year if the continuing slow chessplay is perpetuated.

One of the root causes of our difficulties lies in the behaviour of States feeling themselves not in a situation permitting their renunciation of chemical weapons or, at least, of an option, and this must inevitably produce reactions of the great Powers - namely to maintain security stocks.

The problem is how to bring about a change, how to get out of the vicious circle.

Ambassador Morel's recommendation, based on similar ideas originated earlier, is to use the tool of a ministerial conference, a well-known political instrument to get the impetus for the final phase. In order to be precise, I quote in French: (translated from French)

> "We therefore propose that the Conference begin its next session in January 1991 by meeting at the ministerial level to examine the status of the negotiations at that time, identify the approaches needed to complete them, set a relatively short time-limit and give the corresponding instructions to delegations. The latter would then get down to work with the conclusion of a final agreement clearly in mind and would negotiate under the ministers' direct control." (CD/PV.570, p.16)

(Continued in English)

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, there can be no doubt that this is, at this particular time, the logical approach to the solution.

(Mr. Ochsner, Switzerland)

The problem will be in what way the ministers will establish the guidelines or instructions for their delegations. Will they be able and ready to give appropriate guidelines offering sufficient freedom of action? Will they be able to roughly co-ordinate their directives before the negotiators - you - will be sent back to work? The ministers will presumably be advised by the same specialists who are in charge of formulating your instructions. I have been at the job now for quite some time and have observed that many delegations, and among them very influential ones, are working under remote-control conditions, so to say, which does not facilitate speedy results. But, as the chances of a rapprochement have probably improved in this sector in the meantime, it should consequently be easier to give broadminded instructions. It will be crucial to create the best possible conditions for the 1991 session - the session of the expected breakthrough in many fields.

My second point, if you permit, is this. In view of the desirability or even necessity of universal adherence, a better integration of the non-member States appears indispensable. Although the possibilities for participating in the Conference have been de facto enlarged, the interest in contributing to the outcome of the negotiations has stayed rather modest, the well-known outriders or forerriders excepted. In the last non-members meeting of 1 August, just 12 out of 38 delegations showed up, particularly those which are attending the meetings anyway. The number of non-member States admitted to follow the negotiations as such is not yet a guarantee of their co-operation and even less of their readiness to sign the convention. Efforts from both sides are required to get more participation.

Maybe the present non-member status will remain unsatisfactory as long as non-member countries have no access to the so-called regional groups and their opinions normally come to nothing, ending practically in smoke.

Some consideration should be given to this point. It would be of particular interest to know the bureau's philosophy in this respect. I have taken up this problem in apprehension of a possible negative outcome of the whole exercise rather than because we were suffering from the low profile of our country as a non-member State.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, time flies, and quite a number of key problems are still unresolved. But universality must be secured as soon as possible.

It might be of some help, under these circumstances, if all States of a certain strategic importance would show the flag, i.e. deliver a "declaration of intent" going beyond the Geneva Protocol already confirmed in January 1989 at the Paris Conference. The objection to such an enterprise, of course, will always be: What convention? But we think the work of the Committee has sufficiently progressed to identify the main obligations of the engagement to be entered into. Declared intentions - or obvious mental reservations - to make use of CWs must be denied at once - this is the minimum. What is the value of a declaration of intent? It is true that such an act is not legally binding, and the way to hell is paved with good intentions but it would not be so easy to justify the renunciation of a moral obligation.

(Mr. Ochsner, Switzerland)

My delegation therefore supports the idea of a simultaneous delivery of declarations as mentioned before, preferably at a meeting of foreign ministers of both member and non-member States of the Conference at the outset of the 1991 session, as already proposed by other delegations.

Those are some remarks by an observer who has had the opportunity of following the Conference's meetings over an extended period of time.

Although the drafting of the convention is not yet completed, Switzerland has already started with the first preparations for national implementation.

Finally, I would like to remind you of the assurance given by Secretary of State Jacobi that we are willing to undertake a special effort to support the preparatory conference. We can only hope to be requested to keep our promise in a foreseeable future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Switzerland for his statement and the kind words he had for the President. We have learned with regret that Mr. Ochsner will shortly leave our Conference. I am sure the Conference will join me in extending to him our best wishes for happiness in his future work and private life.

I shall now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee circulated under the symbol CD/1028.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy): Mr. President, I would first like to renew the congratulations already conveyed to you by the Secretary-General of the Italian Foreign Ministry on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for the current month, and to wish you all the best in the accomplishment of your important and delicate duties.

I would also like to thank the members of the Ad Hoc Committee and, in particular, the group co-ordinators and the delegation of China for their collaboration and understanding, as well as Mr. Bogomolov, the staff of the Secretariat and the excellent interpreters.

During the 1990 session, I was encouraged, in the attempt to find a solution, to follow a somewhat different way from the traditional one pursued in the past without any tangible results.

Therefore, I have had several personal meetings, carried out in intensive informal consultations with delegations and co-ordinators, with the aim of identifying common ground and a possible satisfying solution, with the additional awareness, this year, of the coming Fourth NPT Review Conference.

The results of the efforts jointly carried out by all the members of the Committee are contained in document CD/1028, which I have the pleasure of submitting today to the Conference on Disarmament for approval. Unfortunately, neither the efforts deployed in informal conversations nor subsequent discussions undertaken within the Committee have led to the identification of a common approach satisfactory to all.

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

Nevertheless, it was possible to identify common views - as pointed out in part IV of the report entitled "Conclusions and Recommendations" - on the importance of the many positive political changes under way. These are expected to have a bearing on the search for a common approach on the substance of negative assurances.

Against the aforementioned background the Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that ways and means should continue to be pursued in the light of ongoing and future developments. It was therefore generally agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1991 session.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for introducing the Committee's report and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I would like to thank him for the efforts he deployed in carrying out his task.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? It does not seem to be the case.

As indicated in our programme, the Conference will hold an informal meeting, immediately following the plenary, to start the first reading of the technical part of the Conference's annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The English text of the relevant document (CD/WP.388) was placed in the pigeon-holes of delegations on 8 August. The text in the other official languages is available today.

After the informal meeting, if time permits, we shall continue considering the substantive paragraphs concerning item 2 and start consideration of the substantive paragraphs concerning item 3 of the Conference's agenda, which have been circulated as working documents CD/WP.391 and CD/WP.393, respectively.

The Secretariat today circulated the timetable of meetings that the Conference and its subsidiary bodies are to hold next week. The timetable has been drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and, as usual, it is intended for guidance only and can be modified if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

I have no other matters on today's agenda and I therefore intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.573
14 August 1990

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 14 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania)

GE.90-62595/2324B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 573rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, the business before the Conference is consideration of reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as consideration and adoption of its annual report to the General Assembly. However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative may, if he wishes, raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on today's list of speakers the representatives of Canada, the Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing my pleasure at seeing you in the Chair, and by pledging to you the full support and co-operation of my delegation in helping you to carry out your presidential responsibilities during this final, important month of the formal 1990 session.

The only item I intend to address today is the item on chemical weapons. I will offer some Canadian comments on the progress achieved to date in the 1990 session. I also wish to address the priorities my Government attaches to particular aspects of our negotiations on the proposed chemical weapons convention. Further, I will introduce two Canadian technical studies relating to the issues of toxicity determination and the possible costs of operating an international inspectorate. Lastly, I wish to address our recently submitted report on the latest national trial inspection conducted by my authorities.

Mr. President, as we are in the final weeks of the formal 1990 session, it would seem appropriate to offer a Canadian assessment of our achievements to date. In our view, some very useful and important work has been accomplished in the summer session.

Ambassador Hyltenius, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has advanced work on article IX by taking a fresh look at the material upon which such an article could be based. Under his overall direction:

> Working Group A has further considered ways of improving the "protocol on inspection procedures", in particular the section on "alleged use" and the overlaps with the annexes to article VI, and has begun examining the proposal for ad hoc verification;
>
> Working Group B has been particularly successful in finding solutions to some critical technical issues related to articles IV, V and VI, in particular on thresholds, definitions, and dates, and on elements of the question of the "order of destruction";
>
> Working Group C has carefully worked out texts on "amendments", "settlement of disputes", and "measures to redress a situation" which seem to enjoy a high degree of general support and which offer the hope that these issues might well now be on the way to final resolution;

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

Lastly, the various "friends of the Chair" on such issues as article X, "old chemical weapons", and "jurisdiction and control" have made very laudable efforts to develop consensus approaches to these long-standing issues.

Notwithstanding these advances, however, we are disappointed and disturbed that more was not achieved during this past summer, particularly given the sense of heightened expectations that seemed to prevail during the spring session - expectations that my delegation certainly shared, as I indicated in my statement of 24 April.

This failure to achieve greater progress is surprising also in view of the signing, on 1 June, of the United States/USSR bilateral agreement for the cessation of CW production and the destruction of all but 5,000 agent tonnes of their CW stockpiles by 31 December 2002. My Government welcomed that agreement and hoped that it would further facilitate the early conclusion of our multilateral negotiations here in Geneva.

In saying this, I should note that my delegation is not one of those that believe that all it will take to wind up our negotiations and produce a draft convention for signature is sheer political will. Certainly that will be necessary, but there yet remain a number of major, crucial issues to be resolved. There are also important technical questions that still need to be thoroughly addressed if we are to produce a truly effective convention.

The reasons for this limited progress seem as varied as they are elusive. Some have indeed pointed to an alleged lack of willpower. Or perhaps there is an unreadiness in some quarters to accept that we might actually be on the verge of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Others might point to an insidious, dangerous, degradation of the overall negotiating climate, where chemical weapons proliferation is increasing and where chemical weapons are seen by some - erroneously, we believe - as a "poor man's" weapon of mass destruction.

Quite irrespective of the current situation in the Middle East, that area has been a source of particular concern for some time because of the approach of some States in the region to chemical weapons. Chemical weapons were used there not long ago and, recently, threats to use CW have been made which then provoked counter-threats. We call upon all countries to refrain from such potentially inflammatory statements. These can only contribute to heightened tension and greater uncertainty. Canada firmly believes that chemical weapons should have no place in the armouries of modern nations, and that the only road to real security against the chemical weapons threat lies in the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons, on which we in the Conference on Disarmament are now actively engaged.

The Canadian Government's position is very clear: we firmly support the goal of a total ban on chemical weapons. And we want to see this achieved as soon as is feasible - not tomorrow or next week, but also not 5 or 10 years from now. Delay can only add to the risk of greater proliferation and greater use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We also want a convention that realizes our goal of a total ban to be global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable. These three terms are not just catchwords; in our view they are essential if there is to be a total ban.

By "global", we mean a convention to which all of us here (members and observers alike) - and the approximately 80 other States not participating in these negotiations - will wish to become parties. We seek a convention which has addressed the security interests of CW-possessors and non-possessors alike. In this respect, we have carefully noted the recent statements of the Egyptian representative, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, of the Chinese representative, and of the representatives of the United States and the USSR concerning the latter's joint proposals for revisions to the draft convention, contained in document CD/CW/WP.303. My Government believes that the issues raised and the related concerns and differences of view expressed by these and other speakers are vitally important to the nature of the future convention. They must be addressed by us in a thorough and frank manner in our actual negotiations, as opposed to being aired in statements in plenary.

By "comprehensive", we mean a convention that bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons; that provides for the complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities; and that otherwise encompasses all activities that might be relevant to its goals. A convention that does not unequivocally provide these results raises serious concerns in our mind. These concerns stem from our position on globality. The convention must attract the widest possible adherence. The surest path to widest adherence is through the convention's comprehensiveness, i.e. complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities by the end of the envisaged 10-year destruction period as is provided for in the current rolling text. To Canada, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion.

By "effectively verifiable", we mean a convention that empowers the implementing organization with the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance with the convention.

While all three criteria are essential, I should like to underline the importance of the last, and truly effective verification régime. This in our view would be the only way to provide us with the necessary confidence in, and the means of ensuring, a total ban. The implementing organization must not only be responsible for supervising or monitoring the complete and final destruction of declared stocks and production facilities, and the activities of declared facilities producing scheduled chemicals; it must also be able to investigate activities and, as necessary, inspect undeclared facilities.

We are therefore convinced that, to be effective, the verification régime under the convention must be as complete as possible and intrusive to an extent not hitherto realized under any other arms control agreement. In the first instance, this means a challenge inspection component of exceptional rigour. Whether we call it "challenge inspection" or "inspection on request"

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

or however we may characterize it, it stands as the ultimate safety net of the convention - the final means under the convention whereby a State party can seek assurance that other States parties remain in full compliance with their obligations.

Notwithstanding the well-understood apprehensions of some negotiators, we are also convinced that a highly intrusive challenge inspection régime - one that includes access to any site and which ensures that, if it so wishes, the State initiating the inspection process may be represented during it by the presence of an observer - can be made to work without unduly compromising those concerns. In this respect, we have noted the recent statements of Mr. Waldegrave, of the United Kingdom, and the paper he introduced (CD/1012) reporting on his country's experiences in conducting national trial challenge inspections. We also have noted the statement of Ambassador von Wagner, of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 7 August, in which he introduced paper CD/1026. While we recognize that the results of the United Kingdom national trial inspections and those of similar trial inspections elsewhere may not be accepted by some as conclusive, they are highly instructive and offer a concrete basis upon which negotiators can more knowledgeably approach the remaining difficulties with this apsect of the verification issue.

But even when we have satisfactorily resolved the challenge inspection issue, Canada still believes that the verification system for the convention would require additional measures if it is to be effective, measures which would go beyond those of article VI and which would enable the international inspectorate to inspect undeclared facilities, but without invoking the full panoply of article IX: in short, ad hoc verification.

To our minds, ad hoc verification provides the means whereby the international inspectorate can, in a routine manner and with the minimum necessary amount of intrusiveness, periodically "sample" the activities of undeclared facilities and thereby ensure that there are no activities going on at such facilities that would threaten the purposes of the convention. From this perspective, ad hoc verification should not be seen as a substitute for or an extention of challenge inspection; rather, it complements the régime by providing another needed component for effective verification.

We regret that this summer's discussions have revealed that, despite what we had thought were clear explanations of both the Australian paper (CD/CW/WP.286) of 11 April and the United States working paper (CD/CW/WP.300) of 27 June, there is still a considerable amount of concern and uncertainty about what ad hoc verification would involve. We hope that during the next few months, particularly in the intersessional discussions, we and other supporters of the concept will be able to better explain both our reasons for recommending it and its implications. At the same time, we would expect that other negotiators will approach further discussions on this issue with an open and constructive mind.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We are convinced that if we can develop a fully effective verification régime - one that incorporates both a rigorous challenge inspection component and an ad hoc verification component - we will have leapt over perhaps the biggest remaining hurdle to the realization of the convention. There are, as indicated, a number of other major problems that are critical to ensuring the globality and comprehensiveness of the convention, but we believe that they, too, can be best addressed through a constructive and open-minded attitude. My delegation therefore entertains high hopes for the fruitfulness of our forthcoming intersessional discussions and during the next session, accentuated somewhat by the tang of our disappointment with the limited results of the current session.

To assist in these future deliberations, my delegation will soon be circulating, through the secretariat, two further papers for consideration by other delegations in the months to come. The first of these is a study that addresses the issue of the costs of maintaining an international inspectorate. This study, which was conducted by an expert consultant on behalf of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Canada, builds upon the very useful work done some years ago by the Netherlands and United Kingdom delegations, as well as others, and also takes into account more recent data that have become available, particularly about stockpiles and facilities.

For each type of inspection or other verification activity envisaged under the convention, the study posits a series of assumptions about the number of sites involved, the likely size and tasks of the inspection team, the number of days required to complete those tasks, and the possible unit cost of each inspector, and thereby calculates the costs of each form of inspection and the cumulative cost of maintaining the inspectorate. I should like to underline that, in positing such assumptions, the study by no means intends to suggest that the figures cited should be regarded as categorical or definitive. Nor, indeed, do such assumptions represent the judgement of the Canadian Government on what such figures should be. But they do represent a serious attempt, on our part at least, to begin to make educated estimates of the general scale of the effort required. As such, they are intended to engender reflection, further discussion and debate. It is therefore our hope that this study will be considered useful and will help further discussion of the financial implications of the verification régime envisaged under the convention.

The second study that we will be circulating examines and assesses procedures for toxicity determination. This is an internal study that was carried out to assist the Canadian Government and our delegation in determining how to address this topic when and if it arose again in our negotiations. While this topic is not currently being addressed in discussions, it underlies many of the technical aspects that are still under consideration. We believe that the results of our study are interesting and warrant being shared with other delegations in order to assist negotiators in reaching a rational approach to the question of toxicity.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

Lastly, I should like to inform you that we have just circulated document CD/CW/WP.319, of 10 August: a report on a national trial inspection that the Canadian authorities recently carried out, our first such inspection of a commercial facility. This trial inspection involved an examination of the consumption of a simulated "schedule 2" chemical at a pharmaceutical plant. The main focus of the trial inspection was the use of auditing procedures to determine how effective these would be in tracking a particular chemical. I should like to note that one interesting result appears to be that such procedures could be used without encroaching seriously upon confidential business information. Another significant feature was that the presence of a foreign observer - in this case an official from the Netherlands Government - did not increase the confidentiality concerns of the facility being inspected.

Mr. President, I hope that the foregoing comments and the studies and reports noted will be seen as constructive and concrete demonstrations of my Government's firm commitment to negotiating an effective, total ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. Notwithstanding our disappointment that more has not been achieved, we continue to have high expectations that a successful conclusion to our negotiations in the near future is within our grasp. It is in that frame of mind that my delegation will be approaching our intersessional discussions and the 1991 session.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, for his statement and his kind words regarding the President. I also thank him for introducing his delegation's two working papers.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Sang Ock Lee.

Mr. Sang Ock LEE (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, upon taking the floor for the first time in the second part of the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like, on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Korea, to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August, and wish you every success in discharging your important responsibilities at the final phase of the work. I take this opportunity also to pay tribute to the two preceding Presidents - Ambassador de Rivero, of Peru, and Ambassador Sujka, of the Republic of Poland - for the competent and devoted leadership with which they steered the Conference in the busy months of June and July.

The world is now undergoing significant changes, with wider vision and a longer-term perspective. As the unification process of Germany sets into motion, efforts are being actively pursued both by East and West to put an end to the Cold War confrontation and to lay the groundwork for a stable and secure environment for the whole of Europe. On 7 July, the NATO Summit, held in London, put forward through its joint declaration a set of proposals containing wide-ranging disarmament and confidence-building measures, with far-reaching implications to the European security system. One month earlier,

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the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty met in Moscow and released a declaration on 7 June, elaborating new perceptions and visions of the changing realities of Europe.

Amid the process of transformation, the contours to be drawn for the politico-military landscape of the future Europe remain to be seen. However, it is a matter of certainty that the undertakings agreed upon between the two camps and among other parties concerned are bound to move forward the ongoing disarmament negotiations. After all, the process we are witnessing today amply demonstrates that progress in arms control and disarmament is possible with mutual trust and confidence, the creation of which is to a great extent attributable to the climate of openness and co-operation.

With reference to the Conference's work on the convention to ban chemical weapons, the concrete results born out of the agreement signed between the United States and the Soviet Union at their summit in Washington in May-June have evidently contributed to promoting heightened expectations over the prospect of the positive impact it may give to the multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. On the other hand, the frustration voiced over the pace of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament may well be illustrative of the underlying importance of resolving key issues such as inspections on request.

My country's commitment to the ban on chemical weapons is full and definite. At the Ministerial Conference on Chemical Weapons held in Paris in January last year, the Foreign Minister of my country made it clear that the Republic of Korea is not in possession of chemical weapons, nor has it the intention to acquire or produce them.

The Workshop on Chemical Weapons in Münster in June, hosted by the Federal Republic of Germany, provided us with a valuable opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the destruction and verification aspects of chemical weapons. It was a very useful and enlightening experience; particularly the magnitude of costs and safety measures involved with destruction struck us as another important dimension of the problems deserving much attention and consideration.

In the nuclear field, the year 1990 may well be registered as eventful. The agreement reached between the two super-Powers at the Washington Summit to reduce their respective strategic offensive arms underlines another major step forward in the area of nuclear disarmament since the signing of the INF Treaty.

The Conference on Disarmament saw the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and the preparatory consultations held in New York paved the way for the convocation of the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in January next year.

As the Fourth NPT Review Conference is fast approaching, it becomes the foremost preoccupation of the world disarmament community. In view of the particular importance attached to the future of the NPT beyond 1995, all the pertinent issues are expected to come under most exhaustive review. No doubt,

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a full-scope safeguards agreement under IAEA is an essential obligation under the non-proliferation régime. Yet, a certain party to the régime, possessing nuclear facilities and putting this vital commitment on hold, provokes suspicion and misgivings within the world community. My delegation once again calls upon it to place its entire nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of IAEA as expeditiously as possible.

The reforms and changes which led to the breaking down of the Berlin Wall have reached out almost everywhere, and yet the Korean peninsula remains the world's least affected area. With the German unification process actively and speedily under way, and with North and South Yemen merged into one, it is no surprise that the world community increasingly focuses its attention on the Korean peninsula and with a sense of anxiety wonders when a comparable change will take place in the only partitioned nation remaining on Earth.

Indeed, positive developments began to occur. Highlighting these, were the meetings of President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in San Francisco, and later with President Bush of the United States in Washington, on the occasion of the summit talks between the two super-Powers held in May-June of this year. These meetings underscore the importance of promoting normalization of relations among the States in the region and a climate of détente on the Korean peninsula.

An agreement has recently been reached in the preliminary talks between the South and the North of Korea to arrange for the holding of a high-level meeting to be led by the Prime Ministers from both sides in September and October alternately in each other's capital. On the agenda of the meeting is the resolution of the inter-Korean political-military confrontation, and the realization of exchanges and co-operation between the two parts of Korea. These will be the highest-level talks ever held and will give rise to renewed hope for resolution of vital issues central to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the ultimate unification of Korea.

The most merited aspect in the development is the re-opening of the channel of dialogue between the responsible authorities of the two parts of Korea. In this regard, we sincerely hope that the other, suspended inter-Korean dialogues - known as the Red Cross talks, the economic talks, and the parliamentary talks - will also be resumed as soon as possible. The special statement made by President Roh on 20 July 1990, calling for the mutual opening of the border and free travel, is another bold step aimed at breaking the inter-Korean deadlock and creating a climate of openness and reconciliation. We hope that an agreement on inter-Korean travel and communications will be concluded at an early date with a view to promoting mutual opening and exchanges, as we proposed at the beginning of this year.

In our earlier statement made at the spring session this year, my delegation, taking the example of European experiences, stressed the importance of mutual opening, trust and reconciliation as a necessary condition leading to confidence-building and arms-control and disarmament negotiations, and expressed the view that the two sides of Korea should make

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bona fide efforts to create such a vital environment. Now, with the inter-Korean dialogue to be resumed in less than one month's time, the two parts of Korea are put to a test with a dual task: building confidence and consolidating security and peace on the Korean peninsula.

It is a time of changes, changes for the better. We have good reason to keep our hopes alive and high.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I wish to thank the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Sang Ock Lee for his statement and the kind words he had for the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In the Name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

Mr. President, allow me at the outset to express my congratulations to you for presiding over our work in the month of August. You have all the confidence and support of my delegation in discharging the weighty responsibility of fructifying the laborious job of the Conference on Disarmament for 1990. I also wish to express my deep gratitude and appreciation to our previous President, the distinguished Ambassador of Peru, for the excellent manner in which he conducted our work at this Conference.

I have pleasure today, Mr. President, in presenting the advance copy of the national trial inspection carried out in the Islamic Republic of Iran to assess the degree of applicability of the procedures and provisions of the convention we have agreed upon so far. It was not too difficult to gain the support and, in fact, the decision of the Government to move forward with the inspection, because it was well in line with the importance and serious attention that my country attaches to the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the production, development and use of chemical weapons. To receive the full and solid co-operation of all the departments, institutions and industry concerned proved, however, to be a more demanding task, and it required tireless efforts by the organizers to enable them to carry on with the inspection as originally planned and to meet the schedule.

The aim, as I said, was to evaluate how far the agreed provisions are applicable and also to provide the possibility of sharing the views and experience with the delegations involved in these negotiations. The preparatory work, from the inception to submission of the final report, took about one and a half months. The actual inspection was carried out in two days, with 14 experts involved. The inspection site was a plant producing DDVP, which is an agent for production of insecticide. The team consisted of specialists in toxicology, chemical analysis, chemical engineering, instrumentation engineering and industrial-military management. The objective was to conduct a routine inspection in accordance with the provisions of document CD/961.

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The results of this meticulous inspection can be summarized as follows:

Analysis of the samples taken proved that no chemical was produced other than what had been declared before. In order to verify the results, analysis was made, partly inside the plant and partly outside. Samples were also sent to the Department of Chemistry of Tabriz University, where the results corroborated the previous ones;

With the experiences gained during the course of the war, the scientific potential and knowledge of the Iranian experts was at a very good level;

Industrial auditors checked the records to account for the receipt and delivery of chemicals - which showed no inaccuracy in the data provided.

On the basis of this trial inspection and with the practical experiences gained from it, we wish to make the following observations and recommendations for consideration in the convention:

1. The trial showed that implementation of routine inspection is well possible but, with the help of qualified personnel, time and expenses of the inspection will be economized. In this regard, it is advisable to have special training courses for the inspectors.

2. The cost of the routine inspection in Iran was about 40 to 45 thousand dollars. In the light of the high cost of inspection and also the large number of chemical plants, it is suggested to categorize plants and inspection accordingly, so as to optimize the inspection costs.

3. The general volume of routine inspection reports is estimated to be very high at the international level. In order to strengthen the operational methods of inspection, there is a need to define and establish norms for observation and information-gathering for various needs of inspection. The result of unification of the assessment system will be the speedy conclusion of reports by the organization of the convention.

4. The inspection revealed that although existing defined equipment is sufficient, yet there is a need for making the analysis equipment more mobile so that chemicals of low concentration can be identified on site. In this connection, efforts which are now under way by Finland to identify more efficient methods of analysis of chemical agents and the development of the means of instruments required should be valued and appreciated.

5. Among other important issues for the future is standardization methods of analysis and means of calibration of equipment, and establishment of a data base by the organization. It is therefore high time that measures be taken in this regard.

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Mr. President, while I have the floor, I would like now to take the opportunity to make a few remarks with regard to the convention on chemical weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran, having faced the bitter experience of the use of chemical weapons, has done its utmost to sensitize the international community in order to pave the way for an effective and comprehensive convention on the total elimination and prohibition of the development, stockpiling, production and use of chemical weapons. The history of the use of these weapons in the past vividly testifies to the need for a comprehensive convention with clear and unambiguous provisions for its implementation. The convention which is now under negotiation has great security implications for Iran and hence we follow the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on this subject with great care, attention and interest.

For the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the historical approach is a plausible one, but the impact of science and technology in various fields, such as chemistry, chemical engineering, mechanics and bio-technology, should also be studied and be taken into account. This convention is to be an important international instrument which has to prove its applicability for generations to come. This first real and universal experience in disarmament should be crowned with success. In this respect, the trend of progress of such weapons - which will create a potential capacity in shadow - should be carefully studied and identified, and necessary measures should be taken in response to technological and scientific development.

Therefore, our scientific, legal and technical discussions and deliberations should be based upon a scenario approach in order to prevent any possible loopholes in the future. Such an approach will enable us to foresee all contingencies and work out necessary measures in the convention.

There is no doubt that we are working for a multilateral convention in which States with different industrial and scientific capabilities are expected to join. Their security requirements also differ with respect to their regions, which dictate various degrees of security priorities. These topics were taken up this year in the Chairman's open-ended consultations on undiminished security. I have to note with some regret that these exchanges of candid views did not continue.

It is important to remind the Conference that the conditions leading to a bilateral agreement, which is based upon a balance of hidden capacity of chemical weapons production, differ drastically from those of a multilateral accord, which should be based upon a clear perception of security for all. It is therefore not advisable to hastily translate such an agreement into a multilateral accord and persuade the negotiating parties to follow the same prescription. There is no doubt that many positive and productive deductions can be drawn from the bilateral agreement, provided that other pertinent conditions be taken into account before efforts are made to generalize them. Our work should be based upon "precision" and "speed", the basic requirements for a successful conclusion of the convention.

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Before closing, I would like to register the sincere thanks and appreciation of my delegation to the relentless efforts and patience shown by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, who enabled us to enter into more meaningful and deep discussions this year. Notwithstanding the outcome of the work of the Ad hoc Committee for 1990, his valuable contributions will be highly appreciated.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I also thank him for presenting an advance copy of his delegation's working paper on trial inspection.

I have no other speakers on my list. Are there any delegations that wish to take the floor? That is not the case.

I would like to inform you that at our next plenary meeting I intend to submit, for the Conference's decision, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/1027, and the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, circulated as document CD/1028.

In keeping with the Conference's timetable of meetings for this week, open-ended informal consultations on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 7, 8, 3 and 2 will be held in Room I, immediately after this plenary meeting.

There being no other business before us today, I intend to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.